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CHAPTER 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
a) Overview  
The question to be answered in this dissertation is whether the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the 
NCA), promotes or impedes the sustainable growth of the South African economy. This question 
will be answered through exploring the importance of the contribution made by small, micro and 
medium enterprises (SMMEs) to the economy. This research question is premised on the findings 
in structural change theory of development economics.1 This theory advances the view that for a 
developing country to obtain sustainable growth of its economy there needs to be a decline in the 
number of microenterprises over a period of years and an increase in the number small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).2 This dissertation interrogates whether the NCA supports this kind of 
sustainable growth of the South African economy. The hypothesis proposes that the NCA impedes 
the sustainable economic development of South Africa. In support of this, I have examined the 
NCA and the protection that it affords to SMEs in South Africa. Specifically, I have examined the 
extent to which the NCA permits lending to SMEs by financiers, in contrast to the permission 
given to financiers to lend to microenterprises. In addition, I have examined the extent to which 
the NCA protects SME borrowers in cases where the SME qualifies for a loan, so bringing it within 
the provisions of NCA. This is then contrasted with the protection extended by the provisions of 
the NCA to microenterprises. In this investigation, I have undertaken a review of case law in South 
Africa to substantiate my view that the NCA inhibits sustainable growth of the South African 
economy. The decisions raise some important considerations, including problems caused by the 
concept of separate legal personality of juristic persons run by an individual in the context of 
borrowing, the extent to which credit guarantees offered by these individual owners should be 
legally enforceable and the ambiguity of developmental loans envisaged by the NCA. To address 
these problems, I have looked to foreign jurisprudence, especially the legal protection offered to 
SMEs in Australia when taking out a loan. A comparison between South African law and 
Australian law suggests how access to credit by SMEs and microenterprises can be improved to 
ensure sustainable economic growth of the economy.  
                                                          
1 Syrquin M, ‘Patterns of structural change’, in Chenery H et al (editor) Handbook of Development Economics, volume 
1 (1988) 203-273.  
2 Ibid 
 b) Research Methodology  
A doctrinal, desktop-based research method is used. The main documentary data analysed to 
answer the research question is primary legislation, specifically the NCA and the Usury Act 73 of 
1968. Secondary sources, such as commentaries and publications by various researchers will be 
explored. Further documentary data will include empirical data collected in secondary sources. 
Other persuasive legal texts will be utilised, such as the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC), The Australian National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 (the ACCPA) as well as the Australian Code of Banking Practice (the COBP). 
 
c) Limitations to the Study  
The main limitation to this dissertation has been determining the exact number of SMMEs that 
exist in South Africa. Studies so far undertaken have used different methodologies and research 
strategies and their objectives may have differed to the objectives of this paper.3 Despite the 
growing amount of literature and research that is being conducted regarding SMMEs, there is still 
very little known about them. This is largely a result of the high number of unregistered SMMEs 
that exist. A further limitation on the research is that each survey contains different definitions of 
small, micro and medium business. For example, the South African General Entrepreneurial 
Monitor (GEM) measures different types of entrepreneurship and not the number of businesses to 
enable international comparisons. In contrast the department of trade and industry’s (DTI) 
definition of small business is used to determine the number of small businesses in South Africa; 
and this is the definition used in the National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 (the Small Business 
Act).  
  
                                                          
3 Underhill Corporate Solutions ‘Literature Review on Small and Medium Businesses Access to Credit and Support 
in South Africa’ December 2011 available at 
@http://www.ncr.org.za/pdfs/Literaturepercent20Reviewpercent20onpercent20SMEpercent20Accesspercent20toper
cent20Creditpercent20inpercent20Southpercent20Africa_Finalpercent20Report_NCR_Decpercent202011.pdf 
accessed on July 25 2018.  
II. SMEs AND SMMEs IN SOUTH AFRICA 
a) The importance of SMEs in structural change theory of sustainable growth 
Development economics is a branch of economics that focuses on improving fiscal, economic and 
social conditions in developing countries.4 Development economics determines the sustainability 
of the economy in a developing country by looking at the quality of life of the individuals within 
the country and at the Gross Domestic Profit (GDP).5 Development economics presupposes that 
an economy is sustainable when the wealth distribution in the country is visible amongst the people 
of the country.6 The structural change theory of development economics envisages the 
achievement of sustainability envisaged by development economics through various stages of 
industrial change.7 These stages of industrial change are illustrated by the growth of Europe. At 
the start, agricultural activities were taken over by technological advances, meaning that much of 
the labour force was retrenched; however, these people were then absorbed by manufacturing 
companies and were exposed to more business skills.8  
In the first stage, the economic activity mainly comprises agricultural activities, small-scale 
manufacturing and service provision businesses.9 In this stage, the national economy generates a 
low GDP, making self-employment necessary.10 In the second stage, there is a migration from 
small-scale production and service enterprises to small manufacturing businesses, beginning when 
the national income and GDP of an economy increases, allowing for the country and its people to 
have access to more modern technologies which in turn enable innovation.11 Microenterprise 
numbers should decrease with a shift to finding stable jobs within manufacturing industries and 
other service enterprises.12 In the third stage, there should be a migration toward entrepreneurship 
− opportunity entrepreneurship, rather than necessity entrepreneurship.13 Usually the businesses 
started in this stage are large enterprises or enterprises that are able to compete efficiently because 
                                                          
4 Syrquin M op cit note 1 at 265  
5 Syrquin M, op cit note 1 at 265. 
6 Syrquin M op cit note 1 at 267. 
7 Owosuyi IL, The pursuit of sustainable development through cultural law and governance frameworks: A South 
African perspective (2015) PER vol.18 n.5.  
8 Berry et al, The Economics of SMME’s in South Africa December 2002 available at semanticscholar.org accessed 
on August 18 2018.  
9 Syrquin M op cit note 1 at 268 
10 Syrquin M pp cit note 1 at 269. 
11 Syrquin M pp cit note 1 at 270. 
12 S. Kuzents, ‘Modern Economic Growth’ in in Chenery et al Handbook of Development Economics (1988), Kuznets 
observed the tendency for the self-employment rate to decline with economic development. 
13 Syrquin M op cit note 1 
they are run by people who have worked within the industry and have seen an opportunity gap in 
that industry ie competition increases in the market.14 Accordingly, the crux of the structural 
change theory is that sustainable growth of a developing country’s economy ensues only once 
necessity entrepreneurship declines. The growth of microenterprises within industries such as 
retail, repairs, accommodation (small service enterprises) and agriculture are indicators that 
necessity entrepreneurship persists in that economy. 
 
b) International Perspectives of the Value of SMME to an Economy  
The Global Economic Monitor (the GEM) releases bi-annual reports on economic development in 
mature and emerging economies. The data collected is relied on by many international 
organisations, including the World Bank, for the reason that the findings of GEM are arguably a 
good indicator of economic practices which are sustainable. GEM conducted research into the 
effect that entrepreneurship had on economies, concluding that there were two different types of 
entrepreneurship in the world’s economies: opportunity entrepreneurship and necessity 
entrepreneurship.15 The former refers to an active choice made by businessmen to start an 
enterprise for an underexploited business opportunity.16 The latter occurs where people have to 
become entrepreneurs because there is no other money-generating activity available to them.17 The 
outcome of a survey in 11 countries, from both mature and developing economies showed that 
necessity entrepreneurship had no effect on economic growth.18 In contrast, opportunity 
entrepreneurship was found to have a positive impact on the growth of a country’s economy in a 
direct relationship to the growth of the GDP. Necessity entrepreneurship would more often than 
not refer to start-up businesses or microenterprises in concentrated markets. To maintain 
consistency, I will refer to necessity entrepreneurship as microenterprises and opportunity 
entrepreneurship as referring to SMEs.  
                                                          
14 T. Schultz, ‘Education Investment and Returns’ in Chenery et al Handbook of Development Economics (1988), 543-
630. 
15 Acts Z, ‘How is Entrepreneurship Good for Economic Growth?’(2006), Innovations Journal at 99.  
16 Ibid 
17 Acts Z op Cit note 15 at 97 
18 Acts Z op cit note 15 
Research shows that SMEs contribute to economic growth for a variety of reasons, as they 
create jobs for the semi-skilled and unskilled labour force that would otherwise remain jobless.19 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that SMEs are key 
generators of employment and income and are generally drivers of innovation and growth.20 This 
is because SMEs employ more than half of the labour force in the private sector in OECD 
countries.21 
 
III. SMES AND MICRO-ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
a)  What is an SMME in South Africa? 
The Small Business Act defines a small business as a separate and distinct business entity, 
including cooperative enterprises and non-governmental organisations, managed by one owner or 
more which, including its branches or subsidiaries, if any, is predominantly carried on in any sector 
or subsector of the economy mentioned in column I of the Schedule in the Small Business Act.22 
The Small Business Act also includes within its definition of small business a small, very small, 
micro and medium enterprise.23 The schedule of the Small Business Act determines when an 
enterprise will fall into any of the four categories. For different industries in the economy, the 
annual income threshold for each category will be different 24. An example of this, is that in the 
retail, motor service and repair industry, a very small business has an annual turnover of less than 
R3 million, but in the catering, accommodation and trade industry, a very small business should 
have a turnover of less than R100 000.25 For each industry that is included in the Small Business 
Act, a small business is categorised as having an annual turnover of more than R1 million and less 
than approximately R5 million.26 From the definitions provided in the Small Business Act, there 
is a great deal of uncertainty regarding how a business will be categorised, which, in turn, affects 
how statistics are to be collated and presented. Nonetheless, I have used statistics from the DTI in 
                                                          
19 Devey R Second Best? Trends and Linkages in the Informal Economy in South Africa (Unpublished BA Masters 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 2006) 
20 Meeting of the OECD council at ministerial level ‘Enhancing Contributions of SMME’s in i Global and 
Digitalized Economy’ June 2017 available @https://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2017-8-EN.pdf accessed 
on July 21 2018.  
21 Ibid 
22 S1 of the National Small Business Act 102 of 1996.  
23 Ibid.  
24 See the schedule of the National Small Business Act.  
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid.  
determining the landscape of the SMME sector in South Africa. The DTI categorises businesses 
using the definition in the Small Business Act.  
 
b) A Brief History of South Africa’s Economy and What it Meant for SMMEs 
One of the economic models, which could be used to describe the South African economy is known 
as the dual economic model.27 Dualism, as a general term, refers to the conceptual division of 
something into two contrasted or opposed aspects.28 In a dualist approach to the South African 
economy, the economy is considered as two parallel economies within one economy, referred to 
as the formal and informal economy. For the purposes of SMEs and micro-enterprises, the dualistic 
model is best suited as a descriptor of the South African economy. My reason for this is that within 
the multitude of micro-enterprises and small businesses, there are a large number that remain 
unregistered entities as required by the Companies Act.29 The high number of unregistered 
businesses along with their location and consumer base are indicators that these businesses operate 
in a separate economy.30  
The duality of the economy is not a result of the new democratic dispensation but rather a 
product of the apartheid era between 1948 and 1994 when racial segregation was rife. In 1994 
South Africa became a democratic nation. However, the racial segregation of the apartheid era 
period meant that the majority of South Africans, referred to hereafter as the previously 
disadvantaged people, were excluded from economic activity that occurred in the formal 
economy.31 During apartheid, previously disadvantaged persons did not receive skills training to 
enable them to work in the formal economy and were primarily exposed to inferior ‘bantu 
education’. With little formal skills training and a poor scholarly education, most previously 
disadvantaged persons turned to entrepreneurial activities.32 From these entrepreneurial activities, 
grew an informal economy in South Africa, one which persists today, with many business owners, 
                                                          
27Bojabotseha TP, ‘Dualism and the social formation of South Africa‘ (2011) Vol 1 (3) African Journal of 
Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure.  
28 Ibid.  
29 The Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
30 Statistics South Africa ‘Survey of employers and the self employed’ (2013) available @ 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0276/P02762013.pdf accessed on July 21 2018.   
31 White Paper on National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses in South Africa. 
(Notice 213 of 1995, published on March 20 1995).  
32 Devey R op cit note 19 
employees and consumers of products and services offered. 33 Under the segregation laws of 
apartheid the informal economy was mostly contained in the rural areas, attributed mainly to the 
consumer base of these businesses residing in rural areas.34 However, when these laws were 
removed, many previously disadvantaged persons moved to urban areas, to seek employment in 
the formal economy.35 Unable to find jobs, usually on account of the lack of space within the 
formal economy for employment and a lack of education and skills, most remained in urban areas 
and started small businesses.36 Many parts of urban areas then became peri-urban areas and the 
informal economy expanded.37 
Being aware that the formal economy could not support the large number of unemployed 
persons at the end of apartheid and recognising the large number of micro-enterprises that existed 
at the wake of democracy, the Government decided to support this sector of the economy.38 The 
rationale was thought by some to have resulted from a belief that micro-enterprises were a vehicle 
to redress racial income inequalities and to be a means for economic redistribution within South 
Africa.39 During the years 1994-2003, the Government’s main reasons for focusing on SMME 
economy were attributed to the ability of SMMEs to promote employment and redistribute wealth 
amongst South Africans.40 This resulted in the publication of the White Paper on National Strategy 
for the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses in South Africa 1995 (SMME White 
Paper). 
The focus of the SMME White Paper was for Government to create an enabling legal 
framework for SMMEs to operate within; facilitate access to information and advice for 
entrepreneurs; and to improve access to finance and affordable physical infrastructure. In terms of 
the legal framework, the Small Business Act was promulgated in 1996 and the rest of the objectives 
of the SMME White Paper now find expression in the Integrated Small Business Development 
Strategy for 2005 to 2014. The Strategy is based on increasing financial and non-financial support; 
creating demand for small and micro-enterprise products and services and reducing the regulatory 
                                                          
33 Ashman S et al, ‘The crisis in South Africa: Neoliberalism, financialization and uneven and combined 
development’ (2011) Vol 47 The Socialist Register.  
34 Rogerson CM ‘Urban poverty and the informal economy in South Africa’s economic heartland’ (1996) Vol 8 No  
Environment and Urbanisation pg 167-169.  
35 Ibid 
36 Rogerson CM op cit note 34 
37Rogerson CM op cit note 34 
38 White Paper on National Strategy op cit note 26 
39 Berry et al op cit note 8. 
40 Ibid  
constraints on these enterprises. It is evident that the Government has, for the duration of our 
democracy, believed that funding small and microenterprises and making funds more accessible 
to these enterprises would have had a positive impact on the economy, through reducing 
unemployment levels and increasing the GDP of South Africa.41 The reform of credit laws in 
relation to juristic persons could therefore be said to be partly as a result of this belief. Where small 
businesses may contribute to the GDP of South Africa and to employment, the statistics show that 
the types of businesses which contribute most to the economy are the ones which are excluded 
from the scope of the NCA by virtue of its threshold and classification in terms of the Small 
Business Act.42  
 
c) Overview of the Current SMME Sector in South Africa  
There are about 2.2 million SMMEs in South Africa. In terms of the geographical location most 
are housed in Gauteng (46 per cent) and the Western Cape (16 per cent). In the seven-year period 
between 2008 and 2016, the number of SMME’s in Gauteng and Limpopo grew by a cumulative 
total of 30 per cent. However, the percentage economic contribution by these SMMEs to the GDP 
was significantly lower than the percentage growth in the number of SMMEs.43  
As of the last quarter of 2017, the QLFS released by Statistics South Africa today, indicated 
a decrease of 351 000 people in the total labour force of South Africa (formal and informal 
employment).44 In the formal sector, employment declined by 135 000 persons while employment 
in the informal sector increased by  119 000 persons. The decrease in the formal sector 
employment was due to a decline in the rate of employment in the finance, trade, private household 
and mining industries. In the informal sector there was an increase in employment in the 
community, social, personal service, manufacturing, agricultural and construction industries. Of 
the total labour force, the demographics pertaining to skill/education level have had a negative 
variance within a 10-year period from 1994-2014. In terms of skilled employees, there was a 
                                                          
41 Ibid .  
42 Underhill corporate solutions op cit note 3.  
43 Bureau for Economic Research, The Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise Sector of South Africa, commissioned 
by the Small, Medium Enterprise Agency of South Africa January 2016 available @ 
http://www.seda.org.za/Publications/Publications/Thepercent20Small,percent20Mediumpercent20andpercent20Mic
ropercent20Enterprisepercent20Sectorpercent20ofpercent20Southpercent20Africapercent20Commissionedpercent2
0bypercent20Seda.pdf accessed on 27 July 2018.  
44 Stats South Africa, Quarterly Labour Force Survey 7 August 2017 available @ 
https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2017.pdf   accessed on July 28 2018.  
growth from 20.6 per cent in 1994 to 25.2 per cent in 2014 of those who gained employment in 
the formal sector. Low-skilled employees employed in the formal sector dropped from 
32.4 per cent in 1994 to 28.5 per cent in 2014.45 In South Africa, micro and small businesses 
contributed to around 27 per cent of the GDP in 2006. The contribution of small firms to 
employment in South Africa was small because of lack of growth. According to the DTI, most 
small firms go out of business within a short period of time.46  
Of the 2.2 million SMMEs in South Africa, most (944 500 ) operate in the domestic trade 
(wholesale and retail) and accommodation sector of the economy, followed by the community, 
social and personal services sector.47 Businesses in these sectors  employ between  
1 to 10 people. In looking at the annual turnover of SMMEs, the data shows that, at the top end, 
SMMEs in the mining sector had an average turnover of R16 million (annualised) in the first 
quarter of 2015, compared to only R360 000 in the community and social services sector. 
However, the statistics show that the mining sector has the fewest number of entities.  
  
                                                          
45 Ibid 
46Bureau for Economic Research op cit note 43 
47 Bureau for Economic Research op cit note 43  
  
Table extracted from the 2016 SMME survey conducted by SEDA48 
 
Of the 2.2 million SMMEs in South Africa, there are more microenterprises than SMEs (See 
Graph 1 below). Microenterprises have low barriers to entry, meaning that most of enterprises are 
run by one person (the owner); additionally the lack of technology and lack of growth of these 
enterprises means that employment levels remain relatively flat throughout the lifespan of the 
microenterprise. This means that in a country like South Africa, unemployment levels remain quite 
high because there are no businesses with the scope or capacity to absorb the number of 
unemployed persons.49 The extract below from the GEM survey, shows the level of opportunity 
entrepreneurship in 30 countries, ranking these countries from highest to lowest. The X-axis of the 
graph shows that South Africa has a very low level of opportunity entrepreneurship, with the 
business sector populated with microenterprises in the small trade and manufacturing industries, 
which is one indicator that South Africa is not developing as rapidly as other world economies. 
The recommendation made in the GEM report was that developing countries, with high levels of 
                                                          
48 Available at Bureau for Economic Research, The Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise Sector of South Africa, 
commissioned by the Small, Medium Enterprise Agency of South Africa January 2016 available @ 
http://www.seda.org.za/Publications/Publications/Thepercent20Small,percent20Mediumpercent20andpercent20Mic
ropercent20Enterprisepercent20Sectorpercent20ofpercent20Southpercent20Africapercent20Commissionedpercent2
0bypercent20Seda.pdf 
49 Berry et al op cit note 8.  
microenterprises, should develop the small and medium sector by reducing the number of 
microenterprises50  
 
Graph 1: An extract taken from the GEM survey: How Is Entrepreneurship Good for Economic 
Growth Report, which shows opportunity entrepreneurship ranking from the lowest to the 
highest.51  
 
IV. THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT AND JURISTIC PERSONS  
The NCA is the primary source of credit consumer protection legislation for natural persons in 
South Africa. However, the definition of consumer in the NCA includes both natural and juristic 
consumers, but the way in which the NCA is applicable to natural consumers is different to its 
application to juristic persons.52 For the NCA to be applicable to a loan taken out by juristic persons 
the juristic person must have less than a sector specific annual turnover.53 Moreover, where a 
juristic person takes out a loan in what is considered to be a large or intermediate loan agreement, 
the NCA will not apply to that loan contract, regardless of the turnover of the juristic person.54 
This limited and ambiguous application of the NCA to juristic persons prevents sustainable growth 
                                                          
50 Meeting at the OECD op cit note 20.  
51 Acts Z op cit note 15.  
52 S6 of the NCA.  
53 S4(1)(a)(i) of the NCA. 
54 S4(1)(b) of the NCA.  
of the small and medium enterprise sector. A major hurdle to the development of the SMME sector 
is that only microenterprises are afforded protection by the NCA when borrowing money, because 
of the sector specific annual turnover threshold. However, once the microenterprise starts 
producing improved turnover, the NCA is of little use, especially where a microenterprise may 
need a large loan to grow into a small or medium business. In turn, this prevents the kind of 
development promoted by structural change theory.   
The purpose of the NCA is to achieve the kind of sustainable development envisaged by 
developmental economics. However, when members of juristic persons try to enforce the NCA in 
the courts of South Africa, a recurring theme is that the courts are restrained by the legal principle 
of separate legal personality of juristic persons. Hence, the promotion of the purpose of the NCA 
is often invalidated to ensure that the legal principle of separate legal personality is maintained. 
The purposes of the Act set forth below are what I consider to be the most important, and those 
have been considered as important in the High Court.55 These socio-economic purposes directly 
promote the goal of sustainable growth envisaged by developmental economists.  These purposes 
are: 
 
‘The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare 
of South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, 
efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to protect consumers, 
by-  
(a) promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South 
Africans, and in particular to those who have historically been unable to access credit 
under sustainable market conditions; 
( c) promoting responsibility in the credit market by- 
(i) encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and fulfilment 
of financial obligations by consumers; and  
(ii) discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual default by 
consumers; 
(g) addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers and providing 
mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by 
the consumer of all responsible financial obligations. 
  
The NCA applies to credit agreements concluded with a juristic person, with an annual turnover 
of less than R1 million per annum and where the credit agreement can be classified as a small or 
                                                          
55 African Dawn Finance Property Finance (2) (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours (CC) and others [2011] 45 
ZASCA. High Court judgment overruled by SCA is significant in this respect.  
intermediate credit agreement as defined in the NCA56. The current monetary threshold for a small 
credit agreement is R15 000 or less.57 The current monetary threshold for an intermediate credit 
agreement is more than R15 000 but less than R250 000.58 The National Credit Act defines a ‘small 
business’ with the same meaning as provided for in the Small Business Act.59 The NCA creates a 
special category of credit agreements, which are termed developmental agreements for the 
purposes of developing a small business.60 
The NCA provides little explanation as to whether a small business which concludes a 
developmental agreement with a credit provider is treated the same as a juristic person. However, 
because developmental agreements are considered a statutory exception, I assume that the 
legislature intended consumers of developmental credit for small businesses to be protected 
differently to juristic persons taking out an ordinary loan for business use, in terms of the protection 
afforded to them by the NCA. The protection offered to developmental credit consumers is at the 
discretion of the National Credit Regulator.61 What constitutes a developmental agreement is at 
the discretion of the National Credit Regulator62 and little information is available on this. For the 
purposes of this dissertation I will examine credit agreements concluded with juristic persons as 
standard credit agreements in terms of section 8 of the NCA and refer to developmental agreements 
separately. 
If the NCA only governs credit agreements with juristic persons which have an annual 
turnover of up to R1 million, the necessary implication would be that only ‘small businesses’ 
which fall into the micro and very small category in terms of the Small Business Act, would be 
regulated by the NCA. This means that businesses in certain sectors will not be offered any 
protection for taking on loans and that in reality all SMEs are excluded from the protection offered 
by the NCA for loans.  
For businesses that meet the annual turnover threshold and where the credit agreement is 
not considered to be for developmental purposes, their agreements are classified as small and 
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intermediate credit agreements.63 These juristic persons are offered a very limited protection under 
the NCA, which differs greatly from that applicable to developmental credit consumers and to 
natural consumers. For example, juristic persons are not offered the protection of the NCA from 
over-indebtedness and from being victims of reckless lending64 and negative marketing practices.65 
This excludes juristic persons from the protection afforded by section 89(2)(b) of the Act against 
unlawful credit agreements resulting from unlawful advertising. Juristic persons are further 
excluded from the protection of section 90(2)(o), which outlaws variable interest rates from a credit 
agreement. Additionally, any protection offered to natural consumers under Chapter 5, part C, on 
consumer liability, interest, charges and fees, does not extend to juristic persons.  
In the chapters that follow, I will fully address the issues of juristic persons being treated 
differently to natural persons and differential treatment depending on industry and turnover, with 
emphasis on the effect on the economy. Thereafter, the example of how Australian law has dealt 
with the issue of the natural and juristic person divide will found my views on how the NCA can 
be amended to support sustainable economic growth, specifically identifying how the NCA should 
be amended to include those businesses in sectors which contribute the most to the GDP; and in 
addition, to identify how the individuals behind the sole trader can be protected.   
 
V. STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
Chapter one has set out the research question of this paper. In this chapter, I explained the scope 
of the research question with a description of SMMEs and their position in the economy. 
Additionally, I explained how the National Credit Act relates to this research question. Lastly, I 
set out the current situation of the SMMEs in South Africa and their contribution to employment 
and economic growth.   
 
Chapter Two will set out the history of credit protection law in South Africa and explore the 
history of the NCA and its predecessor, the Usury Act of 1968. I shall also explore case law dealing 
with these two Acts, leading to the introduction of the NCA and the reasons that the legislature 
decided to treat natural persons differently to juristic persons. Thereafter, I have illustrated through 
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the use of case law, how juristic persons are disadvantaged due to the lack of credit protection 
offered to them.  
 
Chapter Three will set out the ASIC Act (Cth), the NCCPA as well as the Australian Banking  
Code to examine how credit laws which relate to small businesses have enabled the small business 
economy of Australia to grow rapidly and to contribute significantly to the economy.   
 
Chapter four is the conclusion of the dissertation. In this chapter, I have set out possible solutions 
to ameliorate against the issues raised in Chapter One and Chapter Two. The solutions proposed 
involve adapting some of the standards used in Australia in its regulation of small business finance. 
In this Chapter, I have briefly mentioned the Conduct of Financial Institutions Bill, 2018, the Code 
of Banking Practice in South Africa and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 
of 2002.  
  
CHAPTER 2 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The NCA was enacted in 2005 and came into effect in 2007, intended to be the single piece of 
legislation that would govern consumers and credit providers. The NCA repealed the Usury Act.66 
The NCA is most known for its provisions on the cost of credit, reckless lending and over-
indebtedness.67 The inclusion of these provisions in the NCA were directly related to the 
weaknesses identified in the Usury Act.68 However, these were issues that affected both consumers 
in the SMME credit market and in the consumption market.69 In this chapter, I will discuss the 
Usury Act in some detail along with the exemptions issued thereunder. The purpose of this 
discussion is to highlight how the Usury Act failed to make credit available to SMEs, despite this 
being a primary reason for the 1992 exemptions. Thereafter, I shall explore how the NCA came to 
be promulgated and the reason for juristic persons effectively being excluded from its provisions. 
It is against this background that I begin to describe the legal framework available to protect 
SMMEs. Specifically, I discuss the contrast between the protection offered to natural persons 
under the NCA as opposed to common law protection offered to juristic persons. This is done 
through critically evaluating decisions by the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal. Through 
these cases, I strive to illustrate how the law provides no assistance to support the growth of SMEs. 
The harm is caused through the law not protecting juristic persons, which creates a loophole for 
credit providers to take advantage of the owners or members of juristic persons, as will be 
demonstrated through the case law. I shall deal briefly with developmental credit agreements for 
small businesses and the manner in which this category of agreement could benefit microenterprise 
credit lending. The overarching goal of this chapter is to promote critical thinking about the 
wording of the NCA, the way that courts interpret the NCA and in what way this could impact on 
financial lending to SMEs.  
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II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE NCA 
All people and entities that were involved in the consumption of credit products were protected by 
the Usury Act. The Usury Act is the predecessor of the NCA and constituted one of the first pieces 
of consumer credit legislation in South Africa.70 Under the Act, there was no distinction between 
lending to enterprises and lending to natural persons. In the AAA Investments Case (Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council v AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 2006 (1) SA 27 (SCA))  71, in which 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal setting aside the decision of the High Court was 
upheld by the Constitutional Court, it was held that the Usury Act served as a tight control on all 
contracts of credit which were a vehicle for advancing money.72 All contracts, regardless of who 
the borrower was or what the purpose of the loan was, were therefore regulated by the Usury Act.73 
This meant that the same clauses of protection offered by the Usury Act to natural persons were 
also extended to juristic persons.  The Usury Act regulated money lending transactions, credit 
transaction and lease transactions, all of which implied that a sum of money was extended to a 
borrower by a lender and the repayment of such money was delayed until a later date.74 In any 
credit transaction, one person will always be in a weaker position than the other, usually this will 
be the borrower.75 The Usury Act purported to mitigate against this imbalance of power, through 
regulating the cost of finance and regulating credit contracts.76 The most significant protection 
offered by the Usury Act was that credit providers were prohibited from charging excessive or 
usurious interest rates to consumers.77 Credit providers were obliged to adhere to the cost of 
finance which was prescribed from time to time by the Minister of Finance in South Africa.78  
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Further protective measures included a cap on the amount of the principal debt that the 
Usury Act applied to − R500 000.79 In any contract which was concluded for a money-lending 
transaction, the following particulars had to be contained within the document: the cash amount 
borrowed; the principal debt; the annual finance charge rate; the amount of finance charges and 
the amount of each instalment; the due date for the instalments and the date on which the principal 
debt was due.80 The Usury Act allowed for variable interest rates, which had to be stipulated in the 
contract.81 A major criticism levelled against the Usury Act was that it was a very complex piece 
of legislation and that despite its protective measures, there was no penalty for non-compliance.82 
Many credit providers contravened the Usury Act by not disclosing fees to consumers.83 In 
addition, credit providers did not fully explain the contracts to consumers and many consumers 
did not fully understand the cost of credit, resulting in over-indebtedness84  
The government was also dissatisfied with the amounts of lending to microenterprises. 
Credit providers had stated that they were not willing to lend to microenterprises and to poor 
people.85 This was because the interest caps were too low in relation to the risk of lending to these 
people and enterprises, as well as to offset the high transaction costs.86 In 1988, section 15A was 
introduced into the Usury Act permitting the Minister of Finance to exempt certain categories of 
moneylenders from the provisions of the Usury Act. In the year 1992, the Minister of Finance 
exempted loans under R6 000 under this provision.87 The result was that a microlending sector 
boomed overnight. More and more people became involved in lending to microenterprises and 
poorer South Africans. However, the exemption also meant that none of the protective measures 
under the Usury Act were applicable to contracts concluded for amounts of R6 000 or less. Credit 
providers could charge usurious interest rates on small loans and grant an unlimited number of 
loans to people borrowing small amounts of money.  
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In the same year, 1992, the Government began talks on the National Strategy for the 
Growth of the SMME sector, and the promulgation of Small Business Act.88 The exemption 
seemed like a step in the right direction, given that these SMMEs did not have to provide any 
collateral for these loans.89 The reality, however, was that credit providers were granting loans 
without any assessment of the affordability of the loan to the client, which resulted in over-
indebtedness.90 In addition, credit providers did not seek information from the clients regarding 
the purpose for which the loan was taken; this had the effect of small loans being used for 
consumption purposes by salaried workers and other natural persons.91 The exemption was set at 
a very low amount and so small and medium businesses did not benefit from it.92 Credit providers 
were still unwilling to provide loans to small and medium businesses if they could not charge 
usurious interest rates. To develop, these businesses required amounts of R10 000 to R500 000.93 
If credit providers had lent to small and medium enterprises, the owners of the enterprise would 
have been protected by the Usury Act.  
The 1992 exemption resulted in a large microcredit industry and in an over-indebted 
population.94 People, whether natural consumers or business owners, were not making enough 
income to repay the loans. The loans were not big enough to allow the micro-enterprises to expand 
into small businesses. In the result, consumers were faced with a debt spiral ie they would take out 
more loans to pay off earlier loans. Credit providers implemented multifarious techniques to ensure 
that they got their money back, including withholding a person’s identity document so that they 
would be able to withdraw cash from a debtor’s personal bank account.95 By the year 1994, the 
government had realised the impact of the exemption, and, believing that increasing the minimum 
exemption amount would reduce over-indebtedness, the Government issued another exemption 
notice in 1999.96 Loans of R10 000 or less and which were to be repaid within a period of 36 
months were exempt from the provisions of the Usury Act.97 In addition, the Micro-Finance 
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Regulation Council was set up, to ensure that all credit providers who were offering these small 
loans were registered providers.98  
The DTI had mandated the Rudo Research and Training Committee to elicit 
recommendations on how to protect consumers in credit and micro or personal loan transactions.99 
The committee interviewed 18 different groups of credit consumers,100 including government 
consumer desks, trade unions, academics and general consumers. The general consensus was that 
the exemption notice of 1999, resulted in loans being uncapped, which meant that lenders and 
credit providers, were in some instances, charging 102 to 200 per cent interest.101 The conclusion 
reached was that all interest rates for all loans should to be regulated. This could best be done 
through creating clear interest rate formulae. However, according to Professor Kelly Louw, in 
other research that was conducted by DTI in 2003, it was found that under the Usury Act, where 
there were prescribed interest rates on certain credit products, the credit providers regarded the 
maximum amount chargeable as the prescribed interest rate.102 Consumers would still end up being 
over-indebted because of all of the other costs associated with borrowing money, such as 
transaction costs and administrative charges.103 Often credit providers would charge consumers 
high service fees, in addition to other types of fees.104 The DTI then proposed that the NCA would 
prescribe cost of credit: the NCA would prescribe the formulas for calculating interest and would 
prescribe administrative fees and other costs of credit.105  
Various weaknesses were identified in the Usury Act, through assessments done in the 
SMME sector. These assessments included the Business Regulatory Review by Ntsika Enterprise 
Promotion Agency106 and the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulations Report on SMEs 
Access to Finance in South Africa.107 In 1994, the South African Law Reform Commission had 
notified the DTI of weaknesses in the consumer credit protection legislation after the commission 
had seen the information from the SMME reviews.108 The DTI, which is responsible for the 
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oversight of the credit market in South Africa and particularly, ensuring that access to credit is 
improved for developmental purposes,109 felt that there needed to be a review of the credit law. As 
a result of the problems reported by the South African Law Reform Commission, compounded by 
a poor legislative framework, the DTI set up a technical committee to undertake a credit law review 
in 2004.110 The result of this review was the promulgation of the NCA. It was the technical 
committee that suggested that the NCA restrict credit provision to natural persons but not to juristic 
persons.111 In addition, the committee recommended that the focus of credit regulation should be 
shifted from price control to the protection against over-indebtedness, and to the regulation of 
undesirable lending practices. The rationale for this distinction was the belief that if the NCA were 
to apply to contracts concluded with juristic persons, it would inhibit the flexibility and innovation 
of SMME finance.112 In other words, credit providers would be discouraged from lending to 
microenterprises and other small businesses.  
 
III. PROTECTION AGAINST USURIOUS INTEREST RATES AND COST OF CREDIT 
FOR JURISTIC PERSONS?  
a) Section 6 of the NCA 
Juristic persons are excluded from the provisions in the NCA which pertain to the cost of credit113 
Juristic persons include all such (artificial) persons, regardless of their turnover or the amount of 
the credit agreement.114 In terms of this section, credit providers are prohibited from charging 
consumers any cost which is not stipulated in the regulations. This limits charges of interest, 
service fees and initiation fees. In addition, credit providers may not charge consumers more than 
the prescribed maximum of credit for a particular credit product as set out in the regulations of the 
NCA. Importantly this section sets out that credit providers must show consistency in how they 
calculate the cost of credit for each consumer. In other words, credit agreements for credit products 
which are substantially similar in the ordinary course of the credit providers’ business, must be 
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charged with the same interest rate and additional charges.115 Ergo, consumers must be treated 
with a degree of similarity.116 The NCA also introduced the statutory in duplum rule, which meant 
that all amounts which could be charged by the credit provider as accruing during the time that the 
consumer was in default under the credit agreement might not, in aggregate, exceed the unpaid 
balance of the principal debt under the credit agreement as at the time that the default occurred.117 
Credit providers are prohibited from unilaterally increasing any service fees or interest rate.118 
They are obliged to notify the consumer of such an increase, setting out the particulars of the 
charge concerning fees or a change in the frequency of payment.119 In the case of juristic persons 
credit providers were given carte blanche in determining what rate of interest would be applicable 
to any or all credit agreements.  
 
d) How does the cost of credit become an issue for juristic persons?  
The position of juristic persons regarding the cost of credit was set out in the case of African Dawn 
Finance Property Finance (2) (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours (CC) and others120. The issue 
before the South Gauteng High Court and thereafter the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was 
when an interest rate would be usurious. Dreams Travel, a fashion business of sorts, had required 
a loan of R5 million to import a particular style of jeans into South Africa. After having been 
refused the loan by several banks, Dreams Travel then approached African Dawn Finance, who 
agreed to provide them with the loan, provided that Dreams Travel would agree to the terms set 
out in the credit agreement in terms of which Dreams Travel would pay an interest rate of 5 per 
cent per month on the principal debt. If Dreams Travel did not pay the principal debt and the 
interest by the dates stipulated in the credit agreement, the interest rate would then increase to 6.5 
per cent per month.121 The High Court was seized with the matter when Dreams Travel had not 
met the payment deadlines and was being charged the higher of the interest rates. 122 The SCA had 
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set out the pleadings on behalf of the parties in the High Court in its judgment. 123 Dreams Travel 
sought a declaration that the interest rate of 5 per cent per month was usurious and against public 
policy, and prayed that the court reduce the interest rate to 15.5 per cent per annum or alternatively 
subject the remainder of the principal debt to the highest rate payable under the NCA, which they 
estimated was about 28 per cent per annum.124 The High Court concluded that what African Dawn 
was requesting in interest amounted to roughly 78 per cent per annum,125 and found that this was 
usurious for two reasons. The first was that even requesting 60 percent per annum was 
unreasonable, given that it was more than twice the declared maximum permissible interest rate 
chargeable under the Usury Act and about four times greater than the maximum permissible 
interest rate under the NCA.126 The second reason was that the interest rate stipulated was in 
contravention of public policy and thus unlawful because Dreams Travel, desperately needing the 
loan after being rejected by other finance providers, had less bargaining power than African 
Dawn.127 This meant that the borrower was in a position where it would agree to any terms of an 
agreement. The High Court then made a finding in favour of Dreams Travel that an interest rate of 
28% per annum would be justified.128  
The SCA overturned the decision of the High Court on the basis that the credit agreement 
did not fall within the scope of the NCA and that the rate of 28 per cent per annum which was 
fixed by the High Court, was done so with reference to the maximum annual finance rate set in 
terms of the Usury Act prior to its repeal.129 As the Usury Act no longer applied and the NCA did 
not apply, 28 per cent could not be used a benchmark required by public policy.130 The SCA had 
noted previous findings that the mere fact that an amount of interest seemed high was insufficient 
to render the transaction usurious.131 The SCA unequivocally stated that there was no definite 
principle which determined the ground for the application of the common law rule of usury . The 
common law involved examining whether the transaction has demonstrated extortion, oppression 
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or something akin to fraud, which were not capable of an easy or exact definition.132 Therefore, 
the SCA found that there was no fixed customary rate, which could be used as a standard to 
determine when an interest rate would be usurious.133 The sole issue was the impact that the interest 
rate would have on the credit provider and on the provider’s risk and profit.134 The general position 
was that the juristic person bore the onus of proving there was extortion, oppression or something 
akin to fraud, failing which the court would assume that the loan was worth the rate of interest 
fixed to the borrower.135 The SCA took the view that courts would focus on the need for social and 
commercial certainty when asked to declare that any particular rate of interest is illegal.136 This 
required that interest rates be charged according to the risk to the lender, which was dependent on 
the amount of security the borrower could provide.137 The SCA concluded that a court could not 
by a mere decision or a series of decisions authoritatively declare what a usurious interest rate 
would be.138 For a court to do so, would run counter to the spirit, purport and objects the 
Constitution.139  
Both the High Court and the SCA judgments in African Dawn failed to acknowledge that 
the NCA was not excluded because the sum of the credit agreement was too large or because of 
the asset value of the entity exceeded R1 million, but the NCA was excluded from the interest rate 
cap because Chapter 5, part C of the NCA did not apply to any juristic entity. In my view, the 
courts failed to read the NCA thoroughly. In neither judgment was the exclusion of juristic persons 
from Chapter 5, part C mentioned. The fact that the judiciary has overlooked this might indicate 
that the exclusion of juristic persons from this section is arbitrary. In my opinion, the High Court 
followed the correct approach in determining whether the interest rate applied was usurious, and 
it was correct to look to the NCA to determine what would be an acceptable interest rate, given 
public policy.140 Surely, the NCA provides an indication of what constitutes the public interest. 
The SCA stated that the interest rate prescribed by the NCA on short term agreements would be a 
better comparator than the 28 per cent interest rate. However, I am unable to see how this is a 
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better comparison given that short term credit agreements in terms of the NCA are capped at a 
maximum of R8 000, which is to be repaid within six months. Dreams Travel had taken out a loan 
of R5 million, stating the purpose of the loan to be for business development. The NCA was 
enacted to alleviate over-indebtedness and to create a credit market that was accessible to all South 
Africans after a period in which these interests were not protected. The interest rate formulas that 
it provides are an indication of the maximum rates that can be charged before a transaction is 
deemed reckless or condemning a consumer to a position of over-indebtedness. In addition, the 
High Court had looked at the bargaining power of the borrower, whereas the SCA had ignored this 
element despite its supposed concern for the transformation of contract law . Bargaining power 
should be a relevant circumstance in determining when an interest rate is usurious. In addition, the 
SCA pointed out that the interest rate would depend on the risk to the credit provider, which in 
turn depended on the security provided by the creditor. The members of Dream Travel had signed 
three credit guarantees, all of which were for their personal property.141 Despite the guarantee, the 
credit provider still charged an interest rate that amounted to 78 per cent per annum. The finding 
by the SCA is flawed in my opinion in that it unequivocally protects the interests of commercial 
certainty for credit providers at the cost of protecting SMMEs and other owners of SMMEs.  
The protection offered under the NCA to natural consumers, in contrast to the common law 
position available to juristic persons, results in great social and economic injustice. Natural persons 
have certainty as to what interest rate they can be charged, the service fees and initiation fees. 
Natural consumers are protected by the statutorily enforced in duplum rule. Juristic persons lack 
certainty when they enter into credit contracts. In the result that juristic persons enter into credit 
agreements on unfavourable terms and the only way to challenge this, is through costly litigation. 
However, the SCA judgment in African Dawn, suggests judicial unwillingness to rule on the 
fairness of interest rates. The exclusion of juristic persons from the NCA also makes it difficult for 
courts to apply standards of equity and fairness to credit transactions. As explained earlier, interest 
rates were capped because of the effect that uncapped interest rates had had on the levels of over-
indebtedness. This was an injustice that was faced by natural consumers and juristic persons. The 
distinction between the two in the NCA seems quite superfluous when juristic persons are often 
controlled by a single natural person who uses personal means to finance the operation of the 
SMME. In fact, the distinction would incline South African citizens to obtain loans in their 
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personal capacity rather than in 142 the name of the juristic entity, particularly in the case of 
microenterprises.  
In the interest rate formulas provided in the regulation, ‘RR’ represents the current 
repurchase rate which is used by the Reserve Bank of South Africa − this rate is currently (January 
2019) 6.75%. If a natural consumer takes out a loan for the development of a small business or an 
unsecured credit transaction, the maximum interest rate payable will be [(6.75 x 2.2) + 20% ] per 
year.143 In addition, on these two types of credit products, the consumer will pay the following 
maximum fees: On unsecured credit transactions: 
a) R150 per agreement, plus, 10% of the amount of the agreement in excess of R1 000; 
(b) But never to exceed R1 000.144  
Developmental credit agreements for the development of a small business: 
a) R250 per credit agreement, plus, 10% of the amount of the agreement in  
excess of R1 000; 
(b) But never to exceed R2 500.145  
If people seek out personal loans to fund SMMEs, they are likely to become over-indebted and 
have to seek debt restructuring orders, which will then exclude them from obtaining any further 
finance. For most SMEs which require much larger amounts of finance it would be very risky to 
secure their debts with personal property, as seen in the African Dawn case. SMMEs, under both 
the common law and the NCA, are offered little chance to finance their businesses affordably thus 
precluding their growth and expansion.  
 
IV. PROTECTION AGAINST RECKLESS LENDING FOR JURISTIC PERSONS?  
a) The Position of the NCA on Reckless Lending 
Credit providers must take reasonable steps to assess whether a potential borrower fully 
understands the potential risks and costs of the proposed credit agreement, as well as their rights 
and obligations under the agreement.146 The assessment should take into account the consumer’s 
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debt repayment history, his/her existing means, prospects and obligations.147 Where the credit 
provider has failed to conduct this assessment, the credit agreement will be deemed one of reckless 
lending by the court.148 A credit agreement will also be deemed reckless lending where, despite 
the preponderance of information indicating to the credit provider that the borrower did not 
understand or appreciate the nature, risks, costs, obligations, or that entering into the agreement 
would have made the borrower over-indebted, the provider concluded the agreement.149 Where 
credit is granted recklessly in either of these circumstances, the court can make an order setting 
aside all or part of the consumer’s rights and obligations under the agreement or can suspend the 
force and effect of the agreement.150 If the consumer is over-indebted at the time of the court 
hearing, the court can order the restructuring of the borrower’s obligations under any other credit 
agreement that the borrower has entered into.151 Over-indebtedness has become a legally 
applicable concept as a result of the NCA, in terms of which a court can make a finding that a 
borrower is over-indebted, determined by examining whether at the time of the hearing, the 
borrower is able to satisfy the obligations of the credit agreement, taking into consideration the 
borrower’s financial means, prospects and obligations.152 Stephan Renke et al, make the argument 
that the provisions in the NCA which prohibit certain marketing practices are intended to prevent 
consumers becoming over-indebted.153 by disallowing consumers to take up credit which they 
cannot afford. In addition, these authors state that whilst the in duplum rule is intended for the 
same purpose,154 juristic persons are excluded from the provisions of negative marketing 
regardless of the annual turnover.155  
A court assessing a borrower’s ‘financial means, prospects and obligations’ will consider 
the estimated future revenue of the commercial or business venture for which the debt may have 
been incurred.156 According to ML Vessio, this means that credit providers will have to analyse 
the risk factor of the new enterprise, which may include a feasibility study, in order to assess 
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whether financing the consumer will entail reckless credit.157 This is perhaps a way in which 
natural consumers who own businesses might be protected. This supports my proposition that more 
people will take out personal loans to protect themselves in the event of business failure. 
Conversely, protection of personal assets by using the vehicle of a juristic entity to take credit, is 
often rendered nugatory as sole owners often sign as sureties for the loans of the juristic entity, 
resulting in credit providers first claiming the debt from the surety before the juristic entity is 
declared as insolvent.158 Micro and small business would be better advantaged by taking out 
personal loans, because a juristic entity does not have the advantage of the provisions regarding 
both over-indebtedness and reckless lending. Therefore, it is of little relevance to them whether 
credit providers undertake an assessment of their business.  
Vessio argues further that the fact that the reckless lending provisions do not apply to 
juristic persons means that the NCA creates a loophole for abuse by ‘desperate’ non-juristic 
persons seeking credit by incorporating a company or forming a partnership, which is not a difficult 
task, enabling them to gain access to credit within ‘the guise of the corporate veil’ where it has 
been denied to a natural person.159 The corporate veil protects the natural person from liability for 
debts incurred by the business on insolvency under the doctrine of limited legal liability. Therefore, 
according to Vessio, loans can be taken for consumptive purposes under the guise of a business 
loan. This is relevant to the discussion because it underlines how little support the NCA affords 
juristic persons. Natural persons will only be enticed to form companies to open the door to 
obtaining loans from reckless credit providers. Even if the natural person is theoretically protected 
by the concept of limited legal liability, in practice, the owner will be liable as surety on insolvency. 
It would be in the best interests of the business owner to take out a personal loan rather than a loan 
in the name of the business as they would have more effective recourse against the credit provider 
in terms of the NCA.  
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V. HOW ARE JURISTIC PERSONS ABLE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR A CREDIT 
AGREEMENT?  
As set out in Chapter one, the NCA will not apply to juristic persons, in two instances. The first is 
when the annual turnover or monetary asset value of that juristic person does exceeds R1 million, 
and the second is when the annual threshold of the juristic person is below R1 million but the credit 
advanced exceeds R250 000.160 For small and medium enterprises this is particularly problematic 
because where their main agreement does not fall under the scope of the NCA, ancillary 
agreements will not be covered by the provisions of the NCA.161 This raises other questions. If a 
microenterprise takes out a loan which constitutes a smaller or medium agreement, their ancillary 
agreements will also be governed by the NCA. However, where the microenterprise in itself is not 
covered by the provisions of cost of credit, reckless lending and over-indebtedness, does it mean 
that the credit guarantee will also not have these protections, despite the main agreement falling 
within the scope of the NCA. Under section 8(5) of the NCA, a credit guarantee is defined as that 
which, in terms of the agreement, a person undertakes to satisfy upon demand any obligation of 
another consumer in terms of a credit facility or a credit transaction to which the NCA applies. 
This section does not state ‘the extent that the NCA applies to the main agreement (author’s 
emphasis). There is therefore an ambiguity created even for personal guarantors of small and 
medium loans. When a credit agreement is concluded with a juristic person, the credit guarantee 
will be provided by a natural person in most instances. The purpose of a credit guarantee is to 
provide a credit provider with a form of security that, should the principal debtor – in this case the 
SMME – default on the repayment of the loan, that the credit provider would be able to recover 
their money from another party.162 The person who stands as a surety for the debt of a juristic 
person is a member of that juristic person but despite being a natural person is offered no protection 
under the NCA in respect of the large amounts loaned to the juristic person. In the discussion that 
follows, I have identified two High Court judgments which examine the fairness of this 
differentiation and the constitutionality of these sections.  
                                                          
160 S4(1)(a) and S4(1)(b) of the NCA.  
161 S4(2)(c) of the NCA.  
162 Renke S et al op cit note 67 
In the case of Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd163, 
the constitutionality of the sections in the NCA which treat juristic persons differently to natural 
consumers was brought into question. In particular the defendants argued that the section which 
stated that the NCA only applied to a surety agreement if it applied to the primary agreement was 
unconstitutional in relation to juristic persons because there was already limited application of the 
NCA to a credit agreement concluded with a juristic person. This meant that sureties for juristic 
person credit agreements were given less protection than any other surety. The court held that the 
essence of the NCA was to prevent the reckless extension of credit from credit providers to 
consumers who could not afford the credit.164 The court went on to deal with the constitutionality 
of the exclusion of juristic persons through the lens of section 9 of the Constitution.165 In 
determining this question, the court applied the well-known Harksen v Lane166 [1997] ZACC 12 
dictum that where a provision results in differentiation between people or classes of people, it will 
not fall foul of the equality provision if it can be shown that there is rational connection between 
the differentiation in question and the legitimate governmental purpose for which that provision 
was enacted to further or achieve167 If this rational connection can be shown then there is no breach 
of section 9 of the Constitution. The court then concluded that there was a rational connection to 
the purpose for which these provisions were enacted.168 The court did not set out what the 
government purpose was for this differentiation. The court simply ended the matter by holding 
that the defendants had raised no defence of merit.169  
In Absa Bank Ltd v Lowting and others,170 individual members of a close corporation 
named Pradz Trading CC approached Absa Bank for a loan. The amount borrowed exceeded 
R250 000.171 The NCA therefore, did not apply to the principal debt. Absa Bank had, however, 
furnished these members with a number of documents to sign without explaining to them the legal 
implication of such documents.172 In addition, Absa Bank had failed to provide Pradz Trading with 
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a pre-agreement disclosure, as required by section 92 of the NCA.173 One of the documents that 
was signed was a personal suretyship for the debt incurred by Pradz Trading CC.174 The juristic 
entity defaulted on its repayment of the loan and Absa Bank lodged a claim against the sureties. 
However, the NCA was found not to apply to the credit guarantee on account of the provisions 
section 8(5). This meant that Absa Bank could institute legal proceedings against these members 
without giving them notice or following any other debt recovery procedures.175 In dispensing with 
the matter, the court suo motu raised a number of concerns over the constitutionality of section 
4(1) and 4(2)(c),. The court set out the equality provision of the Constitution and the purposes of 
the NCA. It then went on to say: 
‘The circumstances of this case demonstrate that the specific goals of the NCA 
are not achieved when sureties, in the position of the defendants . . .  are not protected 
by its provisions. In the opinion of the court, this issue should enjoy judicial 
scrutiny.’176 
 
This decision highlighted the imbalance of power between credit providers and owners of 
SMME’s. The court found that the members who had signed the surety agreement had no 
matriculation certificate and did not understand the processes of banks, despite the fact that they 
were members of a close corporation (court’s emphasis).177 The Court stated that this was the 
defendants’ first foray in business and they would have not known any better that they were signing 
as sureties; they did not even have the funds to be a surety.178 This case is a salutary reminder that 
the purpose of the NCA is to protect consumers from being exploited, particularly those previously 
disadvantaged by lack of education. However, by not protecting juristic persons, the NCA allows 
for credit providers to take advantage of these natural persons. Without full credit assessments, 
individuals are coaxed into signing their personal assets over and are then offered no protection by 
the NCA. The High Court summed up this issue well when it said:  
‘The court observes that [it] seems to defeat the objects of the NCA when sureties 
and co-principal debtors who are natural persons, have no protection when a bank 
enters into large agreement with a juristic entity which is a mere shell (as in this case). 
In such circumstances where the sureties and co-principal debtors, more often than 
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not are natural persons, the banks may see a loophole to advance exorbitant amounts 
of credit to juristic entities such as close corporations and have the members sign 
suretyship and co-principal debtor agreements in the full knowledge that they will 
not be able to repay the credit granted. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that 
close corporations are often the vehicle utilized to conduct business by individuals 
with small businesses limited means. This is an issue which should be further 
investigated by the courts.’179 
 
 
An important point set out by the High Court in this case was that institutions, specifically 
banks, should welcome the framework of the NCA as a means of bridging the socio-economic 
inequalities in a substantive manner (court’s emphasis). The NCA should be used as means of 
reforming the credit industry, if for no other reason than to remedy sustained inequalities which 
lead to unrest and social instability. These things the court says are in no way good for the 
development of business.180 The Lowting case marks a significant shift in judicial thought, 
compared to the Hunky Dory case. The former highlights the need to protect individual business 
owners. More importantly, through doing so, it allows the SMEs to borrow larger sums of money. 
As set out earlier, even under the Usury Act, SMEs required larger loans than microenterprises but 
credit providers were always skeptical about lending these amounts. In the current trend, it would 
seem that credit providers, even established banks, are willing to lend to these SMMEs. However, 
the catch is that the members of these juristic persons are standing surety for the debts, rendering 
vulnerable their personal assets should the surety agreement be enforced and the assets (usually 
their homes) sold in execution. In the case of large loans, the guarantee enjoys no protection from 
the NCA, but in practice the bank’s that lend large amounts will offer the same protection to large 
loan sureties, as they do for small loan sureties, even though there is no statutory obligation to do 
so. This applies both to pre-agreement notifications as well as notification of a claim being 
instituted against the guarantor. For small loan sureties, we need to go a step further than this. The 
protection offered to small loan sureties needs to include being protected with the provisions on 
reckless lending, over-indebtedness and cost of credit. Most SMMEs’ owners are people who were 
previously disadvantaged and lack the best financial knowledge. By protecting these individual 
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business owners, it means that credit providers will have to start undertaking reasonable 
assessments of the juristic persons prospects of repaying the loan.  
 
VI. CREDIT AGREEMENTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL BUSINESSES 
The NCA creates a special category of credit agreements, namely ‘Developmental Credit 
Agreements’, which are treated differently to the credit agreements listed under section 8.181 
Developmental agreements are defined in the NCA as ‘an agreement which satisfies the criteria 
set out in section 10.182 This section provides that a developmental credit agreement can only be 
extended by a provider who has registered as such, in terms of section 41 of the NCA and where 
that agreement is for the purposes of developing a small business.183 Credit agreements for the 
development of a small business, remain an unexplored field in South African economic and legal 
academia. In terms of the NCA, a credit provider who purports to provide developmental credit 
must apply for such registration to the National Credit Regulator (the NCR).184 In terms of this 
section, credit providers who are already registered in terms of section 40 of the NCA must apply 
for supplementary registration as a developmental credit provider. The NCR is tasked with setting 
out the conditions under which a developmental credit provider may be granted a licence.185 
However, in setting these conditions, the NCR must keep in mind the need to create an accessible 
credit market, which is responsible, effective and efficient in serving the needs of previously 
disadvantaged persons and low-income persons and communities.186 Developmental credit 
providers have different responsibilities to ordinary credit providers. The NCR may determine that 
the forms used by the developmental credit provider satisfy the section 61 requirement that they 
be written in a plain and ordinary language. In addition, this class of credit provider may not have 
to report to the national credit register when it enters into a credit agreement.187 This means that, 
if the NCR is satisfied, the credit provider will not have to furnish the details of the people or 
juristic persons to which it provides credit.188 The operation of the developmental credit provider 
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is largely left to the discretion of the NCR. For example, the prohibitions on negative marketing 
practices don’t apply to this group of lenders, if the NCR has pre-approved a form of advertising 
to be used by the credit provider concerned. That credit provider may then only use that form of 
advertising.189 In addition, the NCR may pre-approve evaluative mechanisms that the credit 
provider uses to conduct his reasonable assessment of the borrower’s ability to fulfill the 
obligations under the credit agreement.190 The consumer of developmental credit is protected under 
the cost of credit provision, specifically with regard to varying interest rates, which is 
impermissible in a developmental credit agreement.191 However, as set out earlier, the interest rate 
that is applicable to developmental credit agreements is the maximum interest rate allowed by the 
NCA.  
Developmental credit agreements for small businesses could be used as a tool to profitably 
serve the microenterprise sector. This is because these agreements are protected under the reckless 
credit and over-indebtedness provisions and the interest rate is capped. In my opinion, the NCA 
needs to delineate when a developmental loan agreement differs from an ordinary loan extended 
for the purpose of the business: ie is it developmental only when the entity is first beginning its 
operation, or can a microenterprise approach the provider when it merely requires more capital to 
grow? Where more developmental agreements are used to service the microenterprise sector, it 
would force the credit providers to make reasonable assessments of the viability of the business. 
The power of the NCR to create a more responsible credit market for developmental credit 
agreements would open the way for prescribing guidelines as to which types of start-up enterprises 
should be granted credit. This could increase opportunities for more manufacturing and technology 
based businesses to open, which would in turn promote the business economy of South Africa.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
The discussion in this chapter illustrates how the credit protection of juristic persons has weakened 
since the demise of the Usury Act, under which juristic persons were treated much like natural 
persons with regard to uniformly enforced interest rate caps and prescribed formalities. However, 
the technical committee excluded juristic persons from most of the important forms of protection 
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offered by the NCA.  Whilst credit providers are supposed to lend to juristic persons by virtue of 
the fewer formalities involved, microenterprises and small businesses need legal protection to 
sustainably grow (ie without risking personal assets or becoming over-indebted as a result of the 
high interest rates). As much as courts have justified the usurious interest rates charged by credit 
providers in transactions with SMEs, the owners of the juristic persons with which the credit 
agreement is concluded are also taking a risk and are more likely to be financially vulnerable than 
the credit provider. In addition, if the law were to ensure that loans were not granted recklessly to 
juristic persons , it would in my opinion, increase the chances of SMMEs being able to get larger 
companies to provide security for the loan. If a large company can see that a credit provider is 
willing to support the developmental needs of a micro or small entity, it is more likely that a larger 
company will also see value in partnering with the business. The lowering of risk would also result 
in decreasing the cost of credit on the principal debt. Decided cases suggest that courts are driven 
to make conservative judgments in the interest of legal and commercial certainty. However, the 
obiter comments from the judges in all the cases mentioned suggest that there is a need for the law 
to consider the socio-economic reality in which the juristic persons and their owners, find 
themselves. 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 3  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1968 the Australian government had not given much attention to the small business sector, 
as its significance to the economy had not been recognised.192 In 1968, the first expert group was 
appointed by the Australian government to explore the issues facing small businesses and the ways 
in which the government could assist small businesses improve efficiency. This was a landmark 
inquiry and the report it generated is known as the Wiltshire Committee Report.193 This report has 
become the basis upon which many public policy considerations for small businesses are based. 
Of significance was the recommendation that the role of government intervention should be a 
motivational one, by which the government was encouraged to create institutions which were 
focused on motivating the managers of small businesses.194 The Australian government reacted to 
this submission by developing specific schemes to assist small businesses, most notably the 
Business Enterprise Centres, embracing income assistance for unemployed persons starting their 
own business ventures. These schemes assessed the viability of the businesses and provided 
income for these persons for up to a year to allow for the individual to focus on growing the 
business; issued loan guarantees for small businesses seeking additional finance and provided 
business incubators.195 From what I have observed in my research, the Australian government has 
had little role in financing small businesses. Nonetheless, the schemes adopted by the Australian 
government were successful in allowing small businesses to flourish, with a growth from 550 000 
small firms in 1984 to about 2 million small firms in 2016.196  
In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the small business sector of Australia, 
focusing on the contribution of these businesses to the GDP and employment rate. Worth noting 
are the sectors in which the small businesses have proven to be most successful. Thereafter, I shall 
explore lending to small businesses and the regulatory framework which governs this practice. I 
highlight the policy reasons for protecting small businesses in credit lending transactions and the 
reasons why small businesses are treated distinctly from individuals, touching on the protection 
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available to individual consumers. It is of particular interest to gauge the way the rules applicable 
to individual consumers under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act197 (NCCPA) and the 
National Credit Code (NCC), have been modified in their application to small businesses albeit 
under a different regulatory framework. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF SMALL BUSINESSES IN AUSTRALIA 
The Australian business economy is made up of 2 million small businesses, according to the most 
recent study conducted by the Australia Bureau of Statistics.198 In terms of this report, a small 
business is defined as that which either has an annual turnover of less than A$2 million or a 
business which has less than 20 employees. This definition means that businesses with more than 
20 employees but with a turnover of less than A$2 million will still be considered to be a small 
business. In addition, this report focuses on those businesses which are registered with the 
Australian government and which are responsible for paying a goods and service tax (GST).199 For 
the purposes of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, small businesses include microenterprises 
which employ 0-4 employees. However, ‘nano-businesses’, which are those that do not pay any 
GST and do not have any employees, are excluded from this count.200 
The 2 million small businesses, accounted for 93 per cent of all Australian businesses, 
when considered according to their turnover of being less than A$2 million. Roughly 80 per cent 
of the small businesses are microenterprises and 7 per cent of all businesses in Australia have a 
turnover greater than $2 million.201 Most of the small businesses (roughly 61 per cent) have a 
turnover which is more than A$50 000 but less than $200 000 per annum.202 In addition, small 
businesses account for 97 per cent of the total employment of all Australian businesses.203 Medium 
sized firms − employing more than 20 people but less than 199 people − account for 2.4 per cent 
of the total employment.204 Large firms, employing more than 200 people, account for 0.2 per cent 
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of total employment.205 Small businesses account for 33 per cent of Australia’s GDP and are 
responsible for employing 40 per cent of the workforce.206 The small business sector has the 
greatest contribution to the GDP in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries, followed by the 
construction, real estate, rental and hiring services and the professional service industry.207 In these 
industries, small businesses add more value to the GDP than the medium and large sector.208 
As a result of the contribution that small businesses make to the Australian economy in 
terms of both value add and employment, the extension of credit to these businesses, is seen as an 
important act.209 A small business loan is one that does not exceed A$2 million.210 In 2016, the 
Australian Bankers Association produced an economic report on the small business sector in 
Australia, in which it made the following conclusions211: 
- Interest rates to small businesses were at a generational low. 
- The loans that were to be repaid by small businesses were less than A$100 000. 
- Almost half of all small businesses had a loan facility other than a credit card. 
- There were about one million small business loans granted by Australian banks, which 
amounted to A$251 billion owing to banks. 
 
III. WHY REGULATE CREDIT TO SMALL BUSINESSES? 
From an economic perspective, small businesses in Australia are successful. Defaulting on loan 
repayments and over-indebtedness are not common issues faced by small businesses.212 
Historically, they have faced the challenge of unequal bargaining power with the credit provider.213 
The small business might agree to standard-term contracts when desperate for a loan, and little 
information might be made available to the small business before concluding the loan agreement. 
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Executive Summary   
Small businesses in general are often owned and operated as sole traders, which means that 
one individual is liable for the debts of the business.214 Alternatively, small businesses are 
undertaken through a company in which there is a single shareholder or the shareholders are made 
up of a family.215 In Australia a company is a separate legal entity, meaning that the shareholder[s] 
is offered limited liability protection in respect of the debts of the company. However, this does 
not preclude the shareholder (who is often the director as well) from being personally liable for 
debts of the business for which he may have signed for as a surety.216 In many cases, this security 
is granted against personal assets such as the shareholder’s family home. 
Standard loan agreements imposed on these small businesses and their owners unilaterally 
have benefited the credit provider. Unlike large enterprises, small businesses owners often lack the 
expertise needed to negotiate their loan terms and have limited resources to seek financial and 
legal advice to assist in this process.217 This asymmetry of information between the credit provider 
and the small business had the result that the loan agreement was often written in terms which 
were most favourable to the credit provider.218 The implication of this is that risk is shifted from 
the lender to the borrower.   
The regulatory framework which protects small businesses in credit lending transactions 
was adopted upon consideration of a need for a balance between protecting the interests of small 
businesses whilst still ensuring that the commercial interests of the credit providers are adequately 
protected.219 This balance is particularly relevant in the case of start-up businesses where there is 
no established track record in terms of cash flow or profit.220 A further consideration was that the 
small businesses required different and a greater diversity of transactions than an ordinary 
consumer of credit. Small businesses often require repeat transactions and perhaps a variation in 
the size of the loan.221 Therefore, the ordinary protection which exists for ordinary consumers in 
NCCP and NCC would be irrelevant or inappropriate for small businesses. 
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IV. HOW ARE INDIVIDUALS PROTECTED? 
The NCCPA was enacted on 1 July 2010. The NCC is the first schedule of the NCCPA and 
together they form the first national consumer credit legislation in Australia. Prior to 2010, each 
state had its own consumer credit legislation with provisions similar to those the NCCPA and 
NCC. The NCCPA and the NCC apply to the provision of credit if and when the credit contract is 
entered into or proposed to be entered into, and the following is applicable:222 
 
- The debtor is a natural person or a strata corporation; and 
- The credit is provided or intended to be provided wholly or predominantly: 
(i) for personal, domestic or household purposes; or 
(ii) to refinance credit that has been provided wholly or predominantly to purchase, 
renovate or improve residential property for investment purposes; and 
- There is a charge to be made for providing the credit; and 
- The credit provider provides the credit in the course of a business of providing credit 
carried on in this jurisdiction or as part of or incidentally to any other business of the credit 
provider carried on in this jurisdiction. 
 
There may be instances in which the predominant purpose of the loan was for personal purposes 
but that in some way the loan was also used for business purposes.223 A common example of this 
is when a loan is taken to purchase a motor vehicle which is to be used for both private and business 
purposes. The credit provider may protect itself from the application of the NCCPA and NCC, by 
ensuring that the consumer signs a business declaration.224 If more than half of the credit that was 
extended is used for business purposes, the NCC does not apply.225 In some instances, credit 
providers coax vulnerable consumers into signing a business purpose declaration so that they may 
avoid having to comply with the NCC. However, if a credit provider knew or could reasonably be 
construed as knowing that the purpose of the loan was for personal, domestic or household utility 
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and they allowed the consumer to make such a declaration, there would be an offence 
committed.226 
The NCCPA and the NCC impose a responsible lending regime on credit providers. The 
purpose of these obligations, it to reduce the number of prejudicial or inappropriate loans being 
advanced to consumers. Before entering into a credit contract with a consumer, the credit provider 
must undertake an assessment as to whether the credit contract will be suitable for the consumer.227 
This assessment should include:  
- Making reasonable inquiries about the consumer’s requirements and objectives in relation 
to the credit contract;  
- Making reasonable inquiries about the consumer’s financial situation; and  
- Taking reasonable steps to verify the consumer’s financial situation. 
A credit contract will be unsuitable for a consumer if it is likely that the consumer will be 
unable to comply with his/her obligations under the contract or could only comply with the 
obligations if they incurred substantial hardship.228 Substantial hardship would occur where the 
consumer could only comply with the obligations under the contract if the consumer had to sell 
his/her principal place of residence.229 This provision in the NCCPA therefore directly addresses 
the issue of asset-based lending. This is when the lender advances money to a consumer without 
conducting a proper assessment into repayment of the loan but nevertheless finds safety in there 
being some equity available should the consumer default on the loan.230 
 
V. SMALL BUSINESSES REGULATED UNDER THE NCCPA AND THE NCC 
In 2012, the Australian government undertook reform of its financial and credit regulation, an 
aspect of which pertained to extending the protection under the consumer credit regime to small 
businesses.231 The green paper highlighted credit fees, misrepresentation by credit providers and 
failure by credit providers to follow the instructions given by the consumer as reasons why the 
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consumer credit regime should be extended to small businesses.232 The proposals included, 
creating a new credit regime specifically tailored to small businesses or having limited application 
of the current regime, under the NCCPA, extended to small businesses.233 The credit providers 
argued that extension of the existing consumer regime to small businesses would result in small 
businesses having to pay more for credit and would diminish the accessibility of the credit 
market.234 Businesses required funds for growth, whereas individuals required funds for 
consumption purposes.235 The assessment required for business risks was therefore substantially 
different to the assessment required for consumption lending.236 Consumers run into financial 
difficulties by reason of unemployment, illness or over-extension. Businesses run into financial 
difficulties often for more complex reasons. This meant that the responsible lending regime under 
the NCCPA was not so easily extended to businesses.237 Credit providers would have to incur a 
greater cost in assessing the suitability of a small business consumer for credit as there were more 
variables to consider than with an individual consumer.238 This would mean increased cost for the 
small business. The proposed amendment of the NCCPA and the NCC included credit providers 
having to obtain a separate licence to provide small business loans.239 In 2013, the Australian 
government announced that it would not make any change to the legislation, a major reason being 
that there had been no market failures under the current credit regime that protected small 
businesses. In doing so, Australia followed the leading countries in the world, such as America, 
where there consumer credit acts only apply to natural persons and specifically exclude small 
businesses.240 
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VI. HOW ARE SMALL BUSINESSES PROTECTED? 
There is no single comprehensive credit consumer legislation framework in Australia which 
applies to small businesses. From a regulatory perspective, small businesses are supported by a 
framework which focuses primarily on the underlying credit contract and the circumstances which 
led to the conclusion of the contract. Although the general law of contract applies (the common 
law principles) to a large extent, the Australian legislature has tried to create certainty for small 
business consumers by enacting the rules applicable to small business credit contracts and 
individual consumer credit consumer contracts. The Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission Act (ASIC Act),241 sets out rules pertaining to unfair contract terms and 
unconscionable conduct. The ASIC Act, is complemented by Code of Banking Practice (COBP), 
an industry code which legally binds its signatories. The COBP is a valuable piece of soft law and 
is relied on by most consumers in resolving disputes with banks. In addition to the COBP and the 
ASIC Act, it is mandatory for banks to adopt an external dispute resolution body242 responsible for 
resolving any dispute between that bank and consumer. There are two external dispute resolution 
options for banks: the Credit Ombudsman Service Limited and the Financial Ombudsman Service 
(FOS). Most credit providers in Australia use the Financial Ombudsman Service to resolve 
disputes. 
The ASIC Act and the COBP follow the same definition of small business ie both legal 
instruments are applicable to businesses which have fewer than 100 employees if it is a 
manufacturing business, and otherwise any business with fewer than 20 employees or no 
employees.243 It is important to note that there is no monetary threshold regarding the turnover of 
the business, which makes these pieces of law applicable to small businesses.  
VII. ASIC 
a) Unfair Contract Terms 
The ASIC Act renders a standard contract concluded with a small business void if the contract 
contains unfair contract terms and the contract was concluded for a financial product.244 If the 
contract is ab le to prevail with the unfair terms being severed, the contract will not be rendered 
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void.245 The contract is a small business contract if, at the time that the contract was entered into, 
the consumer was a business which employed fewer than 20 persons246, and either the upfront 
price payable under the contract does not exceed A$300,000247 or the contract has a duration of 
more than 12 months and the upfront price payable under the contract does not exceed 
A$1 million.248 
A court will consider various factors, in determining whether a contract is a standard form 
contract.249 These factors include:  
- Whether one party has all or most of the bargaining power relating to the transaction250;  
- Whether the contract was prepared by one party before any discussion relating to the 
transaction occurred between the parties251;  
- Whether another party was, in effect, required either to accept or reject the terms of the 
contract252; 
- Whether another party was given an effective opportunity to negotiate the terms of the 
contract253; and 
- Whether the terms of the contract take into account the specific characteristics of another 
party or the particular transaction.254 
A term of a contract is unfair if it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations under the contract 255 and such term is not reasonably necessary to protect the 
legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term,256 and it would cause 
detriment to a party if it were to be applied or relied on.257 The ASIC Act provides a number of 
examples of terms that would be unfair.258 When a credit provider has concluded several contracts 
identical to the contract in dispute the terms in all identical contracts will be declared unfair and 
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void, even if the said identical contract was concluded with a small business that was not a party 
to the dispute.259 However, there may be instances in which the customer’s circumstances affect 
the finding of unfairness for that particular contract, even if the contract was identical to other 
standard contracts concluded with other consumers.260 If small business consumers who were not 
party to the proceedings in which a term was found to be unfair, would suffer a loss or damage of 
some sort because of the unfair term being in their own contract, ASIC may seek an order to 
compensate non-parties in the same or later proceedings.261 
The ASIC Act has incorporated the general law of contract into its provisions, by including 
unfair contract terms.262 In addition, it has dealt with standard contracts which contain ‘entire 
agreement’ clauses and ‘unilateral variation’ clauses.263 The former provides that the contract 
represents all the rights and obligations between the parties, with the effect that it may absolve 
the lender from any contractual responsibility for any conduct or representations made by the 
lender to a small business consumer regarding the operation of the contract.264 The latter, are 
clauses which give lenders (but not borrowers) a broad discretion to unilaterally vary terms and 
conditions of the contract.265 A unilateral variation clause, allows the lender to increase the cost 
of credit or terminate the contract at its discretion, forcing the small business consumer to exit 
the contract.266 The ASIC Act recognises that lenders are entitled protect their commercial 
interests and therefore proposes that the lender gives substantial notice to borrowers if they are 
planning to unilaterally vary the contract terms.267 More than that, the consumer should be given 
reasonable time to consider exiting the contract, without having to pay additional penalties if it 
does not want to accept the varied term.268 However, everything owing prior the notice of 
variation should be paid 
e) Unconscionable conduct 
Suppliers of financial services are bound by the ‘unconscionable conduct’ provisions of the ASIC 
Act.269 ‘Put simply, unconscionable conduct is conduct against conscience by reference to the 
norms of society that are in question’.270 In determining whether a particular pattern of behavior 
is unconscionable, there does not need to be a particular individual who is identified as being 
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disadvantaged by the behaviour of the finance provider.271 In considering whether conduct to 
which a contract relates is unconscionable, a court  may consider the terms of the contract272 and 
the manner in which and the extent to which this contract is carried out.273 The ASIC Act sets out 
various factors which the court will take into account in determining if the credit provider has 
contravened the unconscionable conduct provisions.274 These factors include:  
- The relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the credit provider and the 
smallbusiness consumer275;  
- Whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the credit provider, the small business 
consumer was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for 
the protection of the legitimate interests of the credit provider276;  
- Whether the small business consumer was able to understand any documents relating to 
the supply or possible supply of the financial services277;  
- Whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were used 
against, the small business consumer or a person acting on behalf of the small business by 
the credit provider or a person acting on behalf of the credit provider in relation to the 
supply or possible supply of the financial services278;  
- The amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the small business consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent financial services from a person other than the 
credit provider279;  
- The extent to which the credit provider’s conduct towards the small business consumer was 
consistent with the credit provider’s conduct in similar transactions between the credit 
provider and other like small businesses280;  
- If the credit provider is a corporation − the requirements of any applicable industry code;281 
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- The extent to which the credit provider was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of the contract with the small business consumer282;  
- The terms and conditions of the contract283;  
- The conduct of the credit provider and the small business consumer in complying with the 
terms and conditions of the contract284;  
- Any conduct that the credit provider or the small business consumer engaged in, in 
connection with their commercial relationship, after they entered into the contract285; and 
- Whether the credit provider had a contractual right to vary unilaterally a term or condition 
of a contract between the credit provider and the small business consumer for the supply 
of the financial services286; and 
- The extent to which the credit provider and the small business consumer acted in good 
faith.287 
The case law suggests that mere inequality of bargaining power does not make the conduct of the 
credit provider unconscionable,288 but it is more an indicator that the unconscionable conduct 
provisions could apply. Where the small business lacks an understanding and is in a more 
vulnerable position, and the credit provider takes advantage of this, it will be unconscionable 
conduct.289 The standard that is looked at in determining when a small business is being exploited 
is what is acceptable in a commercial transaction.290 Where one party exploits their position of 
superior bargaining power in a manner that goes beyond what is acceptable even in a commercial 
transaction, it will be unconscionable.291 
VIII. CODE OF BANKING PRACTICE 
Of all of the banks in Australia, 95 per cent of them subscribe to the Code of Banking Practice 
(COBP),292 a voluntary code of conduct by which banks become bound upon becoming a 
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signatory.293 The provisions in the COBP are legally enforceable against the bank and must be 
incorporated in the contract entered into between the bank and the small business consumer.294 In 
practice, consumers are more likely to enforce their rights under the COBP through alternative 
dispute resolution than to approach a court.295 The COBP sets out extensive obligations for banks 
to observe in relation to their transactions with both ordinary consumers and small businesses.296 
Most notably for small businesses, the COBP includes a responsible lending and full disclosure 
regime for banks to observe, similar to that which is found in the NCCPA.297 At the time of writing, 
the ASIC has approved an amended version of the COBP which will come into effect in April 
2019.298 As a result I have chosen to examine the current version of the COBP and then deal with 
the way in which it has been improved. 
As set out earlier in the chapter, the Financial Ombudsman Service is the external dispute 
resolution system which is favoured by most Australian banks. The Service requires that all 
financial service providers comply with the COBP provisions, even if that financial service 
provider is not a signatory to the COBP.299 From this, it can be noted that the COBP is a much 
respected piece of soft law in Australia and to a large extent is the primary source of protection 
which small businesses turn to with regard to credit transactions with banks.300 
 
a) Responsible Lending 
Clause 27 of the COBP provides that a credit provider must select and apply a credit assessment 
akin to a credit assessment being selected by a diligent and prudent banker who is acting with care 
and skill, before the bank can increase an existing credit facility of the consumer or advance a 
credit facility. The purpose of the assessment is to form an opinion about the ability of the 
consumer to repay the credit.301 The Code Compliance Monitoring Committee (CCMC) has stated 
                                                          
293 ASIC, ‘Approval of financial services sector codes of conduct’ in Policy Statement 183, issued 23 February 
2005, amended 4 March 2005, p 3, at <http://www.asic.gov.au> 
294 Godwin A et al op cite note 214  
295 Ibid 
296 COBP cl 42.  
297 COBP cl. 27.  
298 Australian Banking Association New Banking Code of Practice.   
299 Financial Ombudsman Service, The FOS Approach Responsible Lending Series, 3 How we approach responsible 
lending disputes taking into consideration legal principles, industry codes and good industry practice (Version 1, 
July 2014). 
300 Cl 8.2 (c) of Financial Ombudsman Service Terms of Reference (2018)    
301 CCMC Guidance Note 9 (Provision of credit) 
that whether a credit assessment meets the standard of a diligent and prudent banker is something 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis.302 The committee and financial ombudsman service will 
consider:  
- If the bank has made reasonable inquiries into the small business’s circumstances (the 
vulnerability and possible disadvantage of the consumer) as well as their objectives for 
obtaining the loan;  
- Did the bank verify the financial position of the small business consumer? Did the bank 
assess the information it may have already held in respect of the small business 
consumer?303 
In addition, the CCMC will take into account the NCCPA as well as the ASIC guidelines in 
determining whether credit has been extended responsibly.304 This has the implication that the 
substantial hardship provisions of the NCCPA could apply to small businesses. Hence, a contract 
may be set aside if compliance by the small business depended on the sole proprietor or shareholder 
having to sell their principal place of residence. In the Victorian Supreme Court of Appeal decision 
of Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia305, the court held that it would not be responsible 
lending for the bank to advance a loan if, in its assessment, the only way that the small business 
could afford the credit was when the bank pooled together all resources available to the consumer 
from third parties.306 In essence, the court was saying that the principal debtor should be able to 
repay the existing debt before a loan could be advanced; however a bank was not precluded from 
considering the finance available to the debtor through third parties in assessing the small business 
consumer. 
 
The New Code has improved on clause 27 and has specifically set out in chapter 17:307 
 
If you are a small business, when assessing whether you can repay the loan we will 
do so by considering the appropriate circumstances reasonably known to us about: 
a) your financial position; or 
b) your account conduct. 
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Where reasonable to do so, we may rely on the resources of third parties available to 
you, provided that the third party has a connection to you. For example where the 
third party is a related entity of yours (including but not limited to your directors, 
shareholders, trustees, beneficiaries or related body corporates), or is a partner, joint 
venture, or guarantor of yours. 
 
What is reasonable in terms of looking at third party resource availability will still follow the 
decision in Doggett, meaning that the bank will probably still be prohibited from pooling the 
borrower’s and third parties’ resources in assessing serviceability.308 A borrower’s capacity to pay 
from their own resources is a fundamental consideration. This supports the proposition that a bank 
may not conclude a loan with a small business consumer if the sale of the borrower’s personal 
home was the inevitable consequence of default.  
 
f) Financial Assistance  
Clause 28 of the COBP requires a bank to assist a small business consumer when he/she falls into 
financial difficulty in repaying a loan or any other credit facility.309 Banks are encouraged to help 
the consumer by forming a repayment plan.310 Banks are prohibited from requiring consumers to 
apply for an early release of their superannuation fund (pension) in order to repay the debt.311 In 
the case of businesses, this prohibition may apply to the release of any long-term investments that 
the owner of a small business may have used as collateral for the loan. Additional obligations on 
the banks include communicating effectively with consumers when they incur financial difficulty, 
even if the consumer has not made a specific request of assistance to the bank.312 Banks must also 
provide the consumer with prompt written reasons for not assisting the consumer in financial 
difficulty.313 
In enforcing the bank’s obligations to provide financial assistance to small business 
consumers, the Code Compliance Monitoring Commission will consider the following314:  
- Did the bank genuinely consider the consumer’s request for assistance with their financial 
difficulty, having due regard of the consumer’s circumstances?  
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- Did the bank consider long-term solutions to assisting the consumer when it was clear that 
the short-term solution did not resolve the consumer’s financial difficulty?  
- The bank must provide evidence in writing that it considered the consumer’s individual 
circumstances when it made its decision after assistance was requested? 
 
IX. CREDIT GUARANTORS 
Credit guarantors for small business loans are offered protection under the general law of contract 
as well as under the COBP but not under the NCCPA.315 Equitable doctrines which apply to credit 
guarantors in some circumstances include the  provision that ‘it is unconscionable for a lender to 
enforce a guarantee against a guarantor who was at a “special disadvantage”. 316 A guarantor is at 
a special disadvantage when the guarantor lacks an understanding of English, was not able to 
obtain independent legal advice and was not advised as to the extent of his liability under the 
guarantee. If the guarantor is disadvantaged in this way and as a result of this disadvantage is 
unable to make a judgment as to his own best interest, and the effect of this disadvantage is 
sufficiently evident to the credit provider, unconscionability will arise, where the creditor, being 
aware of the disadvantage, still enters into the transaction with the guarantor.   
Clause 31 of COBP sets out guarantee-related obligations which the banks must abide by 
and incorporate into the guarantees entered into in respect of small business loans. The protections 
include but are not limited to the following:  
 
- Liability under the guarantee must be limited to, or be in respect of, a specific amount plus 
other liabilities (such as interest and recovery costs)317 or be limited to the value of a 
specified security at the time of recovery318; 
- The bank must give a prominent notice in relation to various matters before the guarantee 
is taken, including that the guarantor ‘should seek independent legal and financial advice 
on the effect of the guarantee’319;  
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- The bank must tell the guarantor about any notice of demand made by it on the debtor, and 
any dishonour on any facility the debtor has (or has had) with it, which has occurred within 
two years before the bank tells the guarantor.320 
 
In National Australia Bank Ltd v Rose321, the court considered an earlier version of the COBP. It 
held that a failure of the bank to give prominent notice to the guarantor under the equivalent of 
clause 31.4(a)(i), had the result of a guarantee being set aside. The decision of Doggett, also 
extended clause 27 of the COBP to guarantors. The court held that the bank had an obligation to 
the guarantor to conduct a proper assessment of the small business’s ability to repay the loan. If 
the bank did not fulfil this obligation, the guarantee might be set aside. This has now been 
incorporated into chapter 17 of the new COBP.  
 
X. CONCLUSION  
The Australian legal framework pertaining to loans is remarkable. First, Australia has managed to 
create a separate legal framework for natural persons whilst simultaneously creating a legal 
framework for small businesses. Secondly, due to the ASIC being applicable to all lending 
transactions by credit providers, it prevents credit providers encouraging natural persons to take 
out loans through juristic enterprises. This is because credit providers are consistently held to a 
single standard. Thirdly, instead of the law explicitly setting out rights for small businesses, the 
legislature and drafters of the COBP implicitly create rights for small businesses through setting 
out responsibilities for credit providers. This means that instead of the business owners needing to 
fully understand which set of rights and rules are available for their protection, they just need to 
understand what responsibility the credit provider was meant to undertake. Lastly, the fact that the 
COBP is enforceable only against its signatories, means that there is a gap, albeit a small gap, for 
credit providers to feel that the COBP asks too much of them in relation to the risk of the client.  
For all these reasons, it is my view that a similar system could be beneficial to South African 
SMME credit consumers. 
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CHAPTER 4  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The issue which faces the sustainable growth that SMMEs need , go deeper than simply amending 
the NCA to include further protection for juristic persons. This is because, commercial  loans and 
consumer loans are entirely different. Much like Australia, South Africa has the legal framework 
to support SMMEs. The framework which I speak of, consists not only of the NCA but also of the 
codes of conduct notified in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Service Act322 
(FAISA). This framework is further supplemented by the soft law, which is encompassed within 
the Banking Code of South Africa323 (the Code). I do not purport to suggest that the FAISA or the 
Code be used to govern or to regulate lending to SMMEs in its totality. Rather, the suggestion that 
I make in this chapter, is that these pieces of law, subject to some amendment, be used by the 
courts in interpreting contractual terms in the loan agreements between SMMEs and credit 
providers. One of the key issues of the cases that I discussed in chapter 2, was that the courts were 
making conservative decisions for the sake of protecting commercial certainty. Therefore, the 
NCA was seen as unviable standard to which SMME contracts should be compared to. This then 
raised the question of what recourse SMMEs have other than the broad common law contractual 
rules. The approach which I advocate for, is one in which the courts can turn to the FAISA and the 
Code, to inform their interpretation of the loan contract. In this chapter, I have also considered the 
manner in which suretyship agreements should be governed, particularly when the surety is a 
natural person. Finally, I provide a brief conclusion to this dissertation. 
II. IS THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NCA THE APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION TO 
GOVERN LOANS GRANTED TO SMEs?  
In the preceding chapter, I highlighted why Australia had decided to regulate small business loans 
in a different way to personal loans. The overarching view of their legislature and most credit 
providers being that legislation drafted and adopted to the needs of natural persons cannot be 
equally malleable to suit all commercial realities. I find that a similar approach needs to be 
followed in South Africa because the NCA in its current wording and scope, is not suitable to 
juristic persons. The cases discussed above highlight this inefficiency. Firstly, when the NCA does 
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apply to some SMMEs, there is cherry picking approach to which provisions apply. This means 
that many South African consumers are left with no certainty as to what protection is offered to 
any loan that they may take out. Imagine that you as a consumer take out a personal loan and it 
was granted recklessly by the credit provider, you would be deemed to know that you are protected 
under the NCA. Now imagine that you take out the same amount of loan as a business loan and it 
was granted recklessly, you would think that you have full recourse to the NCA since technically 
you constitute a juristic person consumer that falls under the NCA but in actual fact, you don’t. 
The cases discussed throughout this dissertation, are indicative of the fact that even the courts 
sometimes get confused as to when the NCA applies to juristic persons. The legislature intended 
to create commercial freedom by loosely regulating SMME lending in the NCA but the irony is 
that it may just be resulting in commercial ,uncertainty.  
It is just the reality that the NCA was drafted in a manner which is better suited to 
consumer credit rather than commercial credit. Take a moment to think about what would happen 
if the NCA had set out that before a loan can be granted to a juristic person for the development 
of the business, that the credit provider must be certain that the business would have a reasonable 
prospect of success? This is the standard applied to natural persons, before a loan can be granted 
the credit provider must be satisfied that the person is capable of repaying the debt and one of the 
things which determines this, is whether the person has a consistent income. The point of this mind 
exercise is to show that commercial needs and consumption needs are on opposite sides of the 
spectrum and legislating for all the commercial needs of an SMME, would result in the NCA 
becoming overly prescriptive. 
III.  IF NOT THE NCA, THEN WHAT?  
The law of contract in South Africa is derived from the common law. In terms of the Constitution, 
the common law must be developed by the judiciary, whenever necessary, to promote the spirit, 
purport and objectives of the Constitution.324 The result of this obligation imposed on the judiciary, 
has been that the Constitutional Court has made obiter dicta statements in contractual disputes, 
which have led to uncertainty as to whether or not constitutional standards of fairness, equality 
and good faith are a vital for a contract to be seen as enforceable.325 Whilst, the case law would 
suggest that these are indeed prerequisites for a valid contract, some academics argue otherwise. 
                                                          
324 S2 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
325 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC)  
For example, Justice Malcom Wallis advocates for an approach whereby the right to freedom of 
contract should be respected by the court and that the contract in and of itself dictates the intentions 
of the parties and therefore the validity.326 In this way, the Justice asserts, there will be commercial 
certainty. Again, I do not disagree that commercial certainty is important, however I do advocate 
for an approach whereby the courts consider the substantive factors in a particular commercial 
market and use those substantive factors to determine what would be commercially realistic in that 
market.327 By looking at the substantive factors in the SMME market, the courts will be able to 
take into account the socio-economic reality of the participants of that market. However, this socio-
economic reality should not be the overarching consideration in interpreting a loan agreement.  
IV. HOW SHOULD THE COURTS DECIDE WHAT IS COMMERCIALLY ACCEPTED 
PRACTICE IN AN SMME LENDING MARKET? 
The Code was developed by the Banking Association of South Africa, to serve as an industry code 
for banks.328The purpose of the industry code is to ensure fairness, transparency and accountability 
on the part of the banks. This code is however only applicable to small business consumers and 
natural persons.329 From an enforcement perspective, the code is voluntarily adopted by the banks 
and can only be enforced against the signatories.330 Furthermore, the code can only be enforced by 
the Ombudsman for Banking Services.331 The Code is comparable to the COBP in Australia, 
except that as it currently exists, it has little recognition from the courts and the provisions as they 
are currently drafted, would not have much impact. However, given that the definition of small 
business within the Code is less restrictive than of that found in the NCA because the code applies 
to all small businesses with an annual turnover of R5 million or less, it can be used as a framework 
to determine how participants in the SMME credit market should conduct their commercial 
relationship with SMMEs.332 Before it can be used as a guideline however, there are adaptations 
to be made, which we can take from Australian law.  
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S8 of the Code applies to all credit transactions. In terms of this section the credit provider 
undertakes the responsibility of ensuring that the SMME understands and appreciates the risk and 
the cost of the proposed credit.333 Thereafter, the credit provider must make an assessment of 
willingness of the SMME to repay the loan, which will be determined through a number of factors, 
most notably the assets and liabilities of the SMME and the way in which the financial affairs of 
the SMME were handled in the past.334 This section is comparable to clause 27 of the COBP in 
Australia. Whilst this is a step up from the NCA for juristic persons, the Code still does not create 
an opportunity for all credit providers to adopt a uniform approach in conducting credit 
assessments of SMMEs. Therefore, in my opinion, S8 should be amended to include the standard 
of the‘diligent and prudent banker who is acting with care and skill’ applied by the CCMC in 
Australia. A test such as this informs the adjudicative body of the commercial practice in the 
SMME lending market whilst simultaneously allowing the adjudicative body to consider more 
substantive realities, such as whether or not the credit provider made reasonable inquiries into the 
small business circumstances and objectives for obtaining the loan. Furthermore, S8 should be 
amended to prevent credit providers from granting loans based on the collateral that SMME can 
provide due to the reasons discussed in chapter 2 i.e. this collateral may be all that the business 
owner has. The alternative, is to adopt a provision akin to clause 28 of the COBP as this prevents 
the credit provider from forcing the business owner to cash in long term policies etc. in order to 
satisfy the debt of the business.  
In order for the Code to be beneficial to SMMEs, two things need to happen. The first is 
that it needs to become enforceable as a general industry code for all SMME credit providers. After 
this is done, the courts can then use the Code to help them in determining the fairness of the loan 
contract. The standard of fairness, equality and good faith, are transposed through the Code, honing 
these values into something that is more tangible and industry specific. 
A further tool that could be useful to the court in interpreting SMME loan contracts whilst 
simultaneously causing uniform market participation of credit providers, is the FAIS Act. The 
FAIS Act is comparable to the ASIC Act in Australia. At present the FAIS Act regulates the 
manner in which financial service providers give advice and sell financial products, through 
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enforceable codes of conduct promulgated in terms thereof.335 The scope of the General Code of 
Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and Representatives, of 2003 (the Code of 
Conduct) is drafted in broad enough terms to include all industries within the financial services 
and could therefore be amended to include the SMME credit market as a separate industry to 
regulate in and of itself. At present the Code of Conduct regulates the manner in which financial 
products are marketed and sold, placing restrictions on the kind of marketing practices can be used 
and minimum requirements for products sold.336 There is in my view, enough scope within this 
Code of Conduct, to include regulations against unconscionable conduct. I think what is necessary, 
is for there to be a similar list in the FAIS Act, to the list in the ASIC Act. This could be done 
either through the introduction of a new code of conduct or through the amendment of an existing 
code of conduct. 
Unconscionable conduct is –largely- that which would be conduct that is contrary to 
societal norms or values, or more broadly, contrary to public policy. Important considerations to 
decide if the credit provider acted unconscionably, is whether the SMME could have obtained the 
financial service from another provider for much less. Additionally, whether the credit provider 
acts consistently when dealing with SMMEs. Because public policy is a broad concept and cannot 
be used as a justification to render all contracts null and void. The courts are not hastened to turn 
to public policy or societal norms to determine what constitutes unfair commercial practice, this 
we saw from the cases discussed in chapter 2. However, if the courts have a general list of what 
would be considered as unconscionable conduct in the SMME lending industry, they would be 
more likely to see the conduct of the credit provider, as being unduly beneficial to the credit 
provider. 
South Africa seems to be moving toward an approach of having a more general regulation 
of all financial service providers. This can be seen from the Conduct of Financial Institutions Bill 
(the Bill) which was released for comment in December 2018. The first purpose stated on the Bill, 
is “to provide for the establishment of a consolidated, comprehensive and consistent regulatory 
framework for the conduct of financial institutions that will, protect financial customers, promote 
the fair treatment and protection of financial customers by financial institutions.” Whilst the Bill 
does not set out the specific responsibilities which financial service providers must adhere to. It 
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does authorize the designated Financial Sector Conduct Authority, to prescribe standards related 
to financial products and financial services.337 The Bill sets out some of the standards which the 
Authority should address, including unfair contract terms and fair, just and reasonable terms of 
contracts.338 If the Bill is assented to in the future, it will be a welcomed piece of law for the SMME 
credit market and would negate the need for the Code to amended or for the Code of Conduct to 
be inclusive of a separate category for SMME credit providers.  
 
V. HOW SHOULD SURETYSHIP AGREEMENTS BE REGULATED? 
Financial service providers and natural person sureties should be able to agree if they want that the 
suretyship agreement will be governed by the NCA provisions, even when the principle agreement 
concluded with the juristic entity falls out of the ambit of the NCA. This is possible under South 
African law for two reasons. The first is due to the principle of pacta sunt servanda or freedom of 
contract and the second reason is due to advancing the Constitutional principle of equality.339 One 
of the legally accepted practices in contract law, is for parties to be bound by a set of principles or 
an agreement, which is separate to the document that is be signed or agreed on. Instead parties will 
make reference to the external document or statute, this is known as the doctrine of 
incorporation.340 This principle was discussed in the High Court decision of Clear Creek 
Trading.341 
 In Clear Creek Trading342, First Rank Bank had stipulated that the suretyship agreement 
as well as the principle mortgage agreement would be governed by the provisions of the NCA. 
However, when the case went before the High Court, First Rand had argued that it was a mistake 
and that because the principle agreement was concluded with a juristic person for a loan agreement 
which was considered to be large, the NCA could not govern the agreement.343 However, despite 
this argument, First Rand had acted under the NCA before the case could be brought to court, by 
dispatching a letter under S129 of the NCA.344 Clear Creek had on the other hand argued that the 
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provisions of the NCA governed the agreement and that meant that the plaintiff had breached 
S81(1) and (2) of the NCA because the plaintiff failed to ensure that the defendants had a full 
understanding of the loan being sought and all of the costs that were associated with it.345 The High 
Court, set out principles relating to freedom of contract and the importance of allowing parties to 
be bound by their agreements where there are no weighty considerations which would militate 
against the agreement being applicable to them.346 The court goes on to say that a relevant 
consideration would be whether the agreement infringes upon the legislative authority of 
parliament.347 To determine whether there is such infringement, these are some of the factors to be 
considered: 
 
 the nature, purpose and objectives of the Act in question that the parties seek to incorporate 
and make applicable to their agreement; 
  the question whether the parties’ agreement seeks to advance the objectives of such an 
Act or, conversely, detracts from or undermines such objectives; 
  whether the agreement purports to create obligations for other entities who are not parties 
to the agreement, where such entities may have obligations provided for by the Act that 
the parties wish to make applicable to the agreement; 
  whether the agreement offends the imperatives of public policy or whether the dictates of 
public policy require that the agreement be enforced; 
  whether giving effect to the agreement is likely to be offensive to the principle of 
separation of powers and/or to undermine the legislative authority of parliament; and 
  the facts and circumstances of the particular case.348 
 
The court in essence, went on to make a finding that the agreement did not deter from the 
objectives of the NCA. In fact, the court found that the primary objective of the NCA was to ensure 
fairness and equality and freedom in the South African credit market.349 The NCA in seeking to 
protect consumers, advances the constitutional imperative of equality. When the parties mutually 
                                                          
345 Firstrand Bank v Clear Creek Trading supra note 339 para 11 
346 Firstrand Bank v Clear Creek supra note 339 para 21 
347 Ibid 
348 Ibid  
349 Firstrand Bank v Clear Creek Trading supra note 339 para 22.  
agreed to extend this protection to the agreement, they were seeking to advance the constitutional 
imperative of equality, whether or not this was explicitly stated.350 This the court stated, is conduct 
that should be encouraged, particularly when it is voluntary conduct by the parties. For that reason, 
it is difficult to see how such conduct can be contrary to public policy. Finally, the court expressed 
the view that such conduct does not impede on the doctrine of separation of powers because there 
is no explicit prohibition in the NCA which prevents parties agreeing that the NCA will be 
applicable to their agreement.351 
In my opinion, the court erred in holding that the NCA should be applicable to the principal 
agreement, this is because the legislature had specifically excluded juristic persons from being 
protected by the provisions of the NCA, for large credit agreements. It is difficult to conclude as a 
result of this prohibition, that the separation of powers would not be infringed. If juristic persons 
and credit providers were to voluntarily be allowed to extend the NCA to their credit agreement, 
it may have arbitrary results.  
A credit provider and the surety should be able to voluntarily extend the NCA to the 
suretyship agreement. As alluded to in chapter 2, when the legislature had taken the decision to 
exclude juristic persons from the full scope of the NCA, it was to prevent credit providers being 
discouraged to lend to juristic persons. This reasoning cannot be extended to a suretyship 
agreement concluded with a natural person for a juristic entity loan. This is because the risk of a 
credit provider agreeing to a natural person to stand as a surety, remains the same, regardless of 
whether the person is standing surety for a consumption loan or a commercial loan. Allowing for 
natural person sureties to do this, would also advance the Constitutional imperative of equality 
because all natural person sureties will be treated the same, even when the principle agreement 
does not fall within the scope of the NCA.  
A further benefit of this, is that credit providers are then obliged to explain the full cost of 
credit to the sole owner who stands as surety. Furthermore, it indirectly obliges the credit provider 
to do a thorough assessment of the juristic persons affordability before granting the loan because 
the sole owner surety can challenge reckless lending under S80.352 As discussed in the Lowting353 
above, substantive action from banks requires all natural person sureties to be treated the same, 
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when it comes to pre-agreement notificaions and notifications to bring claims against the surety. 
However, I think that substantive equality and action is better served when sureties are given the 
option of falling into the reckless lending, overindebted and cost of credit protection. Practically, 
I think that this can only become a reality if credit providers make it clear to the sureties that they 
can voluntarily extend the NCA provisions to govern the suretyship agreement.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has explored access to finance for SMMEs and all of the issues related to this access. 
To recap, the first major issues facing SMMEs is the lack of protection offered to owners of the 
SMMEs who offer surety for the loans of SMMEs and the second major issue, is the excessive 
cost of credit to SMMEs and the lack of recourse offered to them by the law. The lack of recourse 
offered by the NCA to SMMEs is detrimental to the sustainable growth of the economy because 
micro-enterprises and small enterprises require finance to grow their businesses in to larger 
enterprises. To achieve sustainable economic development of SMMEs, specific support needs to 
be given to micro-enterprises which are on the brink of becoming small enterprises. As is the 
reality in Australia, small businesses generate better outcomes for the economy because these 
businesses are capable of employing more people and overall contribute more to the GDP of the 
country. It is not enough for South Africa to continue to support SMME growth only at the initial 
level of entry as a micro-enterprise because opportunity entrepreneurship is what is needed for 
there to be sustainable growth of the South African economy. Sustainable growth for South Africa 
does not merely refer to SMEs contributing to the overall GDP but rather, to the ability of SMEs 
which are as a result of opportunistic entrepreneurship being able to absorb some of the 
unemployed people population and thereby contribute to the quality of life of the population.  
The flaws of the legal framework for lending to SMEs have been pointed out in this 
dissertation, through the case law. The case law has illustrated the frustration of the judiciary to 
achieve substantive outcomes for SMES, whilst not impeding on the doctrine of freedom of 
contract and commercial certainty. The result of this has been to the detriment of the SME. The 
uncertainty of the NCA makes this a difficult task for the judiciary and even for the credit provider, 
as seen in Credit Creek Trading. Beyond this however, SMEs cannot grow sustainable if the terms 
of their credit agreement are subject to usurious costs of credit and other unfavorable contractual 
terms. A harsher criticism leveled against credit providers, is that the credit provider will act in its 
best interests in dictating the terms of a loan, when there is no obligatory legal standard to which 
the credit provider must adhere to. The Hunky Dory case suggests that credit providers are easily 
satisfied by minimal collateral for the loan. I say minimal because it is often the case that the 
collateral offered for the loan, is the only personal asset which the owner of the SMME holds. 
However, this practice in and of itself it not viable for sustainable growth of the South Africa 
economy because, this practice has the potential to detract from the quality of life of the business 
owner.  
An SMME credit market, being distinct from the personal credit market and to the credit 
market for large entities, allows for the development of a standard commercial practice within the 
market. The certainty that this creates for SMMEs and credit providers, will have long term effect 
on the sustainable growth of the South African economy SMMEs will be treated more equitably 
in entering into business loans and that the credit providers will be more wary of when their 
conduct could be problematic or one sided. The Conduct of Financial Institutions Bill, is indicative 
of the need for there to be minimum standards which should be adhered to by financial service 
provider. In my view, the Conduct of Financial Institutions Bill, should be given the force of law 
and should be amended to create a specific section of regulation, applicable to lenders within the 
SMME credit market, so that this long term effect can be realized. However, if this Bill is not 
assented to, in my view, the amendments to the Code and the Code of Conduct, would have the 
same effect for the SMME credit market. Finally, the scope of the NCA should be limited to natural 
persons, included in this, natural person sureties.  
 
  
REFERENCES  
Primary Sources  
South Africa  
Legislation  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 34 of 2002 
The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
Regulations of the Natural Credit Act. 
The National Small Business Act 102 of 1996  
The Schedule of the National Small Business Act 
The Usury Act 73 of 1976 
Bills 
 
National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Credit Reform Phase 2) Bill 2012. 
Notices  
General Notice Number 28893,June 2006. 
White Paper on National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses in 
South Africa. (Notice 213 of 1995, published on March 20 1995).  
Case Law 
AAA Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and Another 
(CCT51/05) [2006] ZACC 9  
AAA Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and Another 
(CCT51/05) [2006] ZACC 9 
Absa Bank Ltd v Lowting and Others (39029/2011) [2013] ZAGPPHC 265 
African Dawn Finance Property Finance (2) (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours (CC) and 
others [2011] ZASCA 45. 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) 
Firstrand Bank v Clear Creek Trading (1054/2013) [2015] SCA 
Firstrand Bank v Clear Creek Trading para 7. [2014] GNP 
Micro Finance Regulatory Council v AAA Investment (Pty) Ltd and another 2006 (1) SA 27 
(SCA)  
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Another 
(6408/2008) [2008] ZAWCHC 125; 2010 (1) SA 627 (C)  
Australia  
Legislation  
Australian Securities and Investments Act 2001 (Cth)  
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009  
The Code of Banking Practice   
The National Credit Code (2012)  
Case Law 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chrisco Hampers Australia Ltd (2015) 239 
FCR 33 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 682   
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v JJ Richards & Sons Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 
1224 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Woolworths Limited [2016] FCA 1472, 
[129] 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447   
Paciocco v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28   
Secondary Sources  
Academic Articles 
Financial Ombudsman Service Terms of Reference (2018) 
Financial Ombudsman Service, The FOS Approach Responsible Lending Series, 3 How we 
approach responsible lending disputes taking into consideration legal principles, industry codes 
and good industry practice (Version 1, July 2014). 
Acts Z, ‘How is Entrepreneurship Good for Economic Growth?’(2006), Innovations Journal at 
99.  
Andre Shoombie ‘Getting South African banks to serve micro-entrepreneurs: An analysis of 
policy options’ (2010) Development Southern Africa Journal.755  
Andrew Godwin, Jeannie Paterson and Nicola Howell ‘Credit for Small business, an overview of 
Australian Law regulating small business loans’, (2017) 1. 
Ashman S et al, ‘The crisis in South Africa: Neoliberalism, financialization and uneven and 
combined development’ (2011) Vol 47 The Socialist Register. 
Beaty A et al ‘Consumer credit & privacy reform agenda (part 2 of 2)’ (February 2012) 
Australian Law and Finance Bulletin 122  
Bojabotseha TP, ‘Dualism and the social formation of South Africa‘ (2011) Vol 1 (3) African 
Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure.  
Cantore and Marshall ‘Businesses are people too’ (2014) 42 Australian Business Law Review 
113 at 116  
Deitz A et al ‘Applying consumer principles to small business lending: a solution without a 
problem’ (December 2012) Australian Law and Finance Bulletin 118. 
Devey R Second Best? Trends and Linkages in the Informal Economy in South Africa 
(Unpublished BA Masters thesis, University of Cape Town, 2006) 
Hutchison A, Relational theory, context and commercial common sense: views on contract 
interpretation and adjudication 2017 (2) SALJ 296 p 305.   
Michael Schaeper ‘ A brief history of small businesses in Australia, 1970-2010’ (2014) 2(1) 
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, 222.  
Michelle Kelly-Louw ‘The Prevention and Alleviation of Consumer Over-Indebtedness’ (2008) 
SA Merc LJ 200  
ML Vessio ‘Beware the provider of reckless credit’ (2009) TSAR (2). 274 
ML Vessio The NCA 34 of 2005: Background and Rationale for its Enactment, With A Specific 
Study of the Remedies of the Credit Grantor in the Event of Breach of Contract (unpublished 
LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2015) 195.  
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ‘Impairment of 
Customer Loans’. Executive Summary   
Phamhidzai Bamu et al ‘The NCA: will it increase access to credit for small and micro 
enterprises?’ (2007) Journal of Law, Democracy & Development. 33 
Phil Khoury, ‘Independent Review – Code of Banking Practice’ (31 January 2017). 50.  
Renke S et al ‘can the National Credit Act by agreement be made applicable to (excluded) 
juristic persons’ (2014) 77 THRHR p567- 581 
Reza C Daniels ‘Financial Intermediation Regulation and the Formal Micro-Credit Sector in 
South Africa’ (2010) Development Southern Africa Journal.  
Rogerson CM ‘Urban poverty and the informal economy in South Africa’s economic heartland’ 
Environment&Urbanization Vol 8 No 1 April 1996 pg 167-169.  
Stephan Renke et al ‘The NCA: New parameters for granting credit in South Africa’ (2007) The 
Obiter. 232 
The Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman ‘Small Business Counts, 
Small Business in the Australian economy’ (2016)  
Wallis M, ‘commercial certainty and constitutionalism: are they compatible?’, (2016) Vol 133 
(3), SALJ p. 545 - 568 
 
Explanatory Notices  
ASIC REPORT 564 ‘ Unfair Contract Terms and Small Business Loans’ (March 2018). 
Australian Banking Association New Banking Code of Practice.   
CCMC Guidance Note 9 (Provision of credit). 
Code Compliance Monitoring Committee Own motion inquiry: provision of credit (2017), p 9. 
Wiltshire Report..  
Textbooks  
S. Kuzents, ‘Modern Economic Growth’ in in Chenery et al Handbook of Development 
Economics (1988), 543-630. T. Schultz, ‘Education Investment and Returns’ in Chenery et al 
Handbook of Development Economics (1988), 543-630. 
Syrquin M, ‘Patterns of structural change’, in Chenery H et al (editor) Handbook of Development 
Economics, volume 1 (1988) 203-273.  
Websites  
ASIC, ‘Approval of financial services sector codes of conduct’ in Policy Statement 183, issued 
23 February 2005, amended 4 March 2005, p 3, at <http://www.asic.gov.au> 
Australian Bankers’ Association, Economic Report ‘The small business sector in Australia’, 
(May 2016), available at 
https://www.ausbanking.org.au/images/uploads/ArticleDocuments/134/AB126420_Economic_Re
port__Small_business_sector_in_Australia_-_May16.pdf.   
Berry et al, The Economics of SMME’s in South Africa December 2002 available at 
semanticscholar.org 
Bureau for Economic Research, The Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise Sector of South 
Africa, commissioned by the Small, Medium Enterprise Agency of South Africa January 2016 
available @ 
http://www.seda.org.za/Publications/Publications/Thepercent20Small,percent20Mediumpercent
20andpercent20Micropercent20Enterprisepercent20Sectorpercent20ofpercent20Southpercent20
Africapercent20Commissionedpercent20bypercent20Seda.pdf  
Credit Law Review: Summary of Findings of the Technical Committee (August 2003) ('Summary 
of Findings of the 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/
pubs/rp/rp1516/Quick_Guides/Datahttps://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/print/ch10s04.php 
Meeting of the OECD council at ministerial level ‘Enhancing Contributions of SMME’s in i 
Global and Digitalized Economy’ June 2017 available 
@https://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2017-8-EN.pdf  
RP Goodwin-Groen ‘The NCA and its regulations in the context of access to finance in South 
Africa’ available at http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Rep_NCA_AccesstoFinance_2006.pdf.  
Statistics South Africa ‘Survey of employers and the self employed’ (2013) available @ 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0276/P02762013.pdf  
Stats South Africa, Quarterly Labour Force Survey 7 August 2017 available @ 
https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2017.pdf  
Technical Committee') (also available at http://www.thedti.gov.za//ccrdlawreview/forward.htm  
Underhill Corporate Solutions ‘Literature Review on Small and Medium Businesses Access to 
Credit and Support in South Africa’ December 2011 available at 
@http://www.ncr.org.za/pdfs/Literaturepercent20Reviewpercent20onpercent20SMEpercent20Ac
cesspercent20topercent20Creditpercent20inpercent20Southpercent20Africa_Finalpercent20Rep
ort_NCR_Decpercent202011.pdf  
